PBF PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT
COUNTRY: THE GAMBIA
TYPE OF REPORT: SEMI-ANNUAL, ANNUAL OR FINAL SEMI-ANNUAL
DATE OF REPORT: June. 2019

Project Title: Strategic advice and support to the security sector reform and governance in The Gambia **Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway:** 105728	

PBF project modality:	**If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund:**
☒ IRF ☐ PRF	☐ Country Trust Fund ☐ Regional Trust Fund **Name of Recipient Fund:**

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organization (UN, CSO etc):
UNDP; UNOWAS, DPKO SSR
Government of The Gambia:
Presidency, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Gambia Armed Forces, Gambia Police Force and other Security Sector Institutions, National Assembly, the Office of the Ombudsman, The Judiciary, Civil society organizations, The Academia and National Think Tank
List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:

Project commencement date[1]: May 1st 2017
Project duration in months:[2] 32

Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below:
☐ Gender promotion initiative
☐ Youth promotion initiative
☐ Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions
☐ Cross-border or regional project

Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):
UNDP: $ 1,400,000
    : $
    : $
    : $
Total: 1,400,000

    *The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account

How many tranches have been received so far: Two

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[1] Note: commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.
[2] Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

Report preparation:
Project report prepared by: Kellie Conteh
Project report approved by: Aissata De/Seraphine Wakana
Did PBF Secretariat clear the report: Yes
Any comments from PBF Secretariat on the report: No
Has the project undertaken any evaluation exercises? Please specify and attach: N/A

Signed by

Kellie Conteh, SSR Advisor, Signature............................ Date. 13/6/19

Aissata De, UNDP Resident Representative, Signature.................... Date. 13/.06./19

Ndella Faye-Colley, PBF Secretariat Coordinator, Signature.............. Date. 13/6/19

Seraphine Wakana, UN Resident Coordinator, Signature................. Date. 13/06/19

NOTES FOR COMPLETING THE REPORT:
- *Avoid acronyms and UN jargon, use general / common language.*
- *Be as concrete as possible. Avoid theoretical, vague or conceptual discourse.*
- *Ensure the analysis and project progress assessment is gender and age sensitive.*

PART 1: RESULTS PROGRESS

1.1   Overall project progress to date

Briefly explain the **status of the project** in terms of its implementation cycle, including whether all preliminary/preparatory activities have been completed (1500 character limit):
During this reporting period covering January to June 2019, the SSR project has picked up momentum to champion the execution of SSR activities. Firstly, the President met the the SSR international advisers in January and reiterated his government's renewed political will and leadership of SSR. A new Chair of the SSR Steering Committee (SC) has been appointed in the person of the Minister of Justice with promises of a strong leadership to expedite the implementation of planned SSR activities. His high access to the Presidency provides the hitherto missing channel to secure timely Presidential intervention to expedite the process This level of access needs to be enjoyed also by other key actors though, to ensure the enhanced engagement of government required to achieve the overall SSR goals. Having formally endoresed the NSP, the project now focuses on the drafting of 2 key strategic documents: National Security and SSR Strategies.
Two of a 3-level gender-responsive SSR training courses have been completed and the final level (advance) is due to be undertaken in late June to graduate a fully-trained subject matter experts as gender focal persons for the various security sector institutions and to help develop gender policies in line with national priorities.
Coordination amongs SSR International partners continues to be strenghtened and regular weekly meetings has become institutionalized to support and advice on SSR activities.

Given the recent/current political/peacebuilding/ transition situation/ needs in the country, has the project been/ does it continue to be **relevant** and well placed to address potential conflict factors/ sources of tensions/ risks to country's sustaining peace progress? Please illustrate. If project is still ongoing, are any adjustments required? (1500 character limit)
The PBF-funded SSR project continues to be of immense relevance to the overall reform efforts of the new administration to address potential conflicts factors or tensions. The need for the reform of the sector to ensure a more efficient and accountable security and justice service delivery that underpins development is reflected in the country's national development plan to corroborate this point. State security continues to be heavily reliant on the delpoyed ECOMIG force, majority of whom, are Senegalese.
ECOWAS has supported by recruiting a Communications Strategist who now helps in public awareness raising, confidence building in the security sector institutions and to strengthen assurances that the sector is now changing from its past repressive ways of delivering security to new dispensation with a gender consideration. The incremental reform activities signals a new dawn of a new security sector on the path to respecting the rule of law. This will culminate with realignment of the right personnel fit-for-purpose for the more balanced new sector and devoid of the repressive elements of the past. Extended periods of international support would be required to instiuttionalise the new ethos been built across the sector.

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In a few sentences, summarize **what is unique/ innovative/ interesting** about what this project is trying/ has tried to achieve or its approach (rather than listing activity progress) (1500 character limit).

It remains valid that the 3-phase SSR training (advance level now pending), that this project had introduced, is a model of Gender-Responsive SSR approach which puts at the centre, the actual skills transfer to the beneficiary institutions of the sector in order for them to acquire the requisite capacity to champion entrenching of gender mainstreaming across the sector - physically, culturally and legally - as a strong foundation to extend such capacity across government.To roll out the initiative, plans for a Gender Caravan in being finalized for the Gender Focal Group (in partnership with UNAIDS) undertake a country-wide sensitization to inspire more women to take advantage of current women empowerment endeavours to find their voices in bringing to the fore the prevalence of GBV amongst security service families and highlight HIV/AIDS awareness.

Also, the impending tailored retreat for high-level governement stakeholders will provide an opportunity for national actors to better understand the tenets of SSR (shared from best practices and lessons learnt) and how to contextualize the Gambia case, its techinical and political imperatives, in order to hasten the percieved slowness of the process. The successful completion of the retreat for the security heads (already done in Nov 2018), has yielded significant improvement in their understanding and engagement in the process. Increased engagement is expected at the highest levels after the government high-level reteat.

Considering the project's implementation cycle, please **rate this project's overall progress towards results to date**:
on track

In a few sentences summarize **major project peacebuilding progress/results** (with evidence), which PBSO can use in public communications to highlight the project (1500 character limit):
The lauching of the NSP on 10th June served as major progress to offer guidance in forging ahead despite the significant delays in the past on right-sizing of the sector to ensure sustainability and efficiency, amongst others. Towards this end the project has supported the formulation of strategy options and scenario analysis to provide policy and decision-makers with options to navigate highly sensitive decisions using transparent mechanisms in the reform process

Another peacebuilding result relates to the concensus built around intense consultations and coordination among civil society, media and security services in the design of implementation plans for the National Security Policy and addressing of gaps and challenges identified in the SSR assessment report.

For this, 2 drafting teams of 10 locally inducted representatives of various institutions (both public and private) have recently been commissioned by the government to draft a national security strategy and a Security Sectore Reform strategy with the support of the SSR project and International Advisers Group (IAG), A gender Caravan has also been launched on 29 May to conduct a nation-wide tour to raise awreness on gender mainstreaming, SGBV, HIV and IADS in close collaboration with UNAIDS and Transitional Justice.

In a few sentences, explain how the project has made **real human impact**, that is, how did it affect the lives of any people in the country – where possible, use direct quotes that PBSO can use in public communications to highlight the project (1500 character limit):
The project focus is primarily at the policy level; however given the participatory nature and strong capacity-building interventions of the process, ordinary people across the country have engaged in the process by severally been consulted and thus improving the relationships

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across the security-civilian public divide. The myth about security been only for the uniformed service personnel is also broken and more open dialogue is impacting on how the public engages in dialogue relating to the security in their localities, regions and at the national levels. A recent perception survey carried out by AFRO BAROMETER in Sept and Oct of last year showed that "68% of Gambians say perpetrators of crimes and human-rights abuses during Jammeh's regime should be tried in court irrespective of the work of the TRRC". This remained directly linked to a desire for an effective SSR process that makes the security sector more accountable and responsive to the security needs of the people

If the project progress assessment is **on-track**, please explain what the key **challenges** (if any) have been and which measures were taken to address them (1500 character limit).
The project has largely returned on-track. Government's engagement continues to be the main challenge. Some success has been registered recently in the sense that the Presidency has begun to be seen positively reacting to updates/feedbacks from the international partners by making the call for progress to be made. The IAG has been unrelenting in its meeting with high-level actors to urge for their direct involvment and support to the National Security Adviser and the Office of National Security. Given that there still seem to be a low level of understanding of the SSR concept across the government, it is envisaged that more sucesses would be achieved once the high-level retreat is implemented with the full participation of the target participants. The High-Level retreat is expected to provide the opportunity for government to build a national consensus and
International partners continues to engaged in using 'good offices' to encourage the government to stay focused and engaged in the process. With the new Chair of the SSR Steering Committee now shifted to a more-accessible Minister to the Presidency, more speed would be gained in the decision-making process to maintain the momentum now achieved.

If the assessment is **off-track**, please list main reasons/ **challenges** and explain what impact this has had/will have on project duration or strategy and what **measures** have been taken/ will be taken to address the challenges/ rectify project progress (1500 character limit):


Please attach as a separate document(s) any materials highlighting or providing more evidence for project progress (for example: publications, photos, videos, monitoring reports, evaluation reports etc.). List below what has been attached to the report, including purpose and audience.
a) National Security Policy launched on 10 June 2019
b) Draft outlines (frameworks) for the development of the National Security Strategy and Security Sector Reform Strategy
c) Workshop Reports, Gender training and Caravan launching reports,
d) SSR Activity Notes to file
e) Exit Strategy

1.2 Result progress by project outcome

The space in the template allows for up to four project outcomes. If your project has more approved outcomes, contact PBSO for template modification.

<u>**Outcome 1:**</u> The SSR stakeholders benefit from the necessary strategic support to elaborate and implement an inclusive national security strategy

Rate the current status of the outcome progress: on track with significant peacebuilding results

Progress summary: *Describe main progress under this Outcome made during the reporting period (for June reports: January-June; for November reports: January-November; for final reports: full project duration), including major output progress (not all individual activities). If the project is starting to make/ has made a difference at the outcome level, provide specific evidence for the progress (quantitative and qualitative) and explain how it impacts the broader political and peacebuilding context. Where possible, provide specific examples of change the project has supported/ contributed to as well as, where available and relevant, quotes from partners or beneficiaries about the project and their experience. (3000 character limit)?*

The SSR assessment report has been formally endorsed by the government (cabinet) pending the issuance of a full 'white paper' A set of recommendations setting the stage for the implementation of therecommendations of the assessment report have been issued by the cabinet

The project has inducted a team of strategy drafters of 10 personnel each in a week-long induction (in April 2019) to prepare for the drafting of both the National Security Strategy and SSR Strategy. The Office of National Security (ONS) has been trained to lead the 2 teams of drafters to write and complete the 2 strategies in the next 12 weeks from June 2019.

The Office of National Security (ONS) continues to be built with a skeletal staffing capacity. Although the initial staff shrinked a little after peacekeeping deployments of some of its members, effort are ongoing to enhance the staff capacity and raise the number to 12 personnel by the end of the year 2019.

The Governance structure and the ONS trained staff are being built and hopefully to be decentralized, through the NSA including regularising National Security Council (NSC) meetings to oversee the reform process. A regular meeting of the heads of the security institutions continues to take place on bi-weekly basis to provide a forum for enhanced integration and collaboration amongst the security institutions to be coherently responsive to the security needs of the state and people in response to NSC directives. This forum is now held regularly and chaired by the NSA indicating an improved collaboration with the security institutions. It also indicates acceptance of the coordinating role of the NSA and the ONS. Whilst there is some room for improvement in this relationship, this development is critical for the SSR process.

Outcome 2: The SSR support of the international community is coherent and coordinated.

Rate the current status of the outcome progress: on track

Progress summary: *(see guiding questions under Outcome 1)*
Significant gains continues to be registered and this comes through coordinating the international actors, albiet, especially at the technical level, than coordination within the government. International SSR partners are cautiousy optimistic that a dedicated and effective government coordination body could be attained by the end of the year 2019.

The 3 levels of coordination of the international pertners remain as follows:

First at the Steering Committee (SC) level, the UN, ECOWAS, AU and EU (and DCAF) meeting together with key Government Ministers in providing oversight of the implementation of the project; as the Project Board currently chired by the Minister of

Justice.. This forum provides the bridge and interface between the government and the relevant international partners on SSR.

Secondly, coordination of the international partners is carried out at the level of the SSR International Partners Forum. This forum is at the Ambassodorial level and held regularly at the request of its members and/or at the request of the SSR Advisers group. The International SSR Partners meeting is held to be updated on the SSR process and also to provide the opportunity for international actors to share information on development relating to their area of support to the Gambian SSR efforts.

The third level of coordination is at the technical level comprising the SSR advisers. It includes the Defence and SSR Advisers currently deployed in The Gambia, constituting the SSR International Advisory Group (IAG). It is currently comprised of advisers from: UN, ECOWAS, EU (and DCAF), USA, AU, France, Spain, and Turkey. The group meets most frequently than the other levels, In this regard, the UN SSR Workplan provides the basis for the implementation of SSR activities. Recently, the government has requested for SSR activities be integrated into one SSR Joint Work Plan to enhance visibility and inter-partner coordination. So far, the SSR activities of ECOWAS and EU-DCAF have been incoporated in the joint work plan

Outcome 3:

Rate the current status of the outcome progress: Please select one

**Progress summary:** *(see guiding questions under Outcome 1)*

Outcome 4:

**Rate the current status of the outcome progress: Please select one**

Progress summary: *(see guiding questions under Outcome 1)*

1.3 Cross-cutting issues

National ownership: How has the national government demonstrated ownership/ commitment to the project results and activities? Give specific examples. (1500 character limit)	Like most transitioning states, there is always a high level of commitment for SSR in the beginning than what is now, been demonstrated for the most part thereafter. Following the submission of the assessment report to cabinet last year and the lack therefrom of a 'white paper' of cabinet directives, much of the commitment waned and no clear direction seemed to be forthcoming. since then. It would appear that a common national vision is yet to be crystalized until recently when a decisin was made by the presidency to move the Chair to the Minister of Justice. The engagement of the SSR advisers in trying to keep the momentum of advising and urging government while encouraging the involvment of local actors to take firm ownershi, appears to be paying off in strenghtening oversight mechanisms.

	There is however, a rather pervasive misconception that the assessments were meant to take the hard decisions relating to for instance, right-sizing of the security forces, including identifying and pinpointing specific personnel for the purpose. Government needs to engage much more in the process. Such engagements include but not limited to timely schedule of meetings and the actual convening of the right level of forum to consider the diverse and sensitive issues as a government and to provide clear direction through for example, such a White Paper.
Monitoring: Is the project M&E plan on track? What monitoring methods and sources of evidence are being/ have been used? Please attach any monitoring-related reports for the reporting period. *(1500 character limit)?*	The project M&E Plan is in place and being utilised. During the period, given that mainly advocacy and advisory activities have taken place, there are no reports to share at this time.
Evaluation: Provide an update on the preparations for the external evaluation for the project, especially if within last 6 months of implementation or final report. Confirm available budget for evaluation. *(1500 character limit)*	Too early to evaluate. Project may last longer than anticipated given the no cost extension, slow pace of government and other factors (like misconceptions or percieved miscalcuations of service heads) directly impacting on SSR implementation.
Catalytic effects (financial): Did the project lead to any specific non-PBF funding commitments? If yes, from whom and how much? If not, have any specific attempts been made to attract additional financial contributions to the project and beyond? *(1500 character limit)*	Given the UN PBSO support to the sector to support the core drive of policy and strategy elaboration. The EU has committed 1.5 million USD through parallel project to support complementary SSR Activities. The World Bank has also committed resources to support the Public Expenditure Review of the sector and provision of adequate support in provding financial analysis within the SSR process.
Catalytic effects (non-financial): Did the project create favourable conditions for additional peacebuilding activities by Government/ other donors? If yes, please specify. *(1500 character limit)*	ECOWAS, AU, US, Spain, France, Turkey and Qatar have contributed personnel, mainly security sector advisors to provide techncial and advisory support to the SSR process in the Gambia.
Exit strategy/ sustainability: What steps have been taken to prepare for end of project and help ensure sustainability of the project results beyond PBF support for this project? *(1500 character limit)*	The support to the set-up and operationalization of the Office of the National Security is looking forward to decentralizing the office to cover country-wid. The, Advisor ensures sustainability of results. Towards that end some of the Advisory capacity is focused on ensuring linkage with the SSR process and the consitutional review process with the aim of ensuring that the newly established Office is reflected in the constitutional and legal framework going forward and ensured legitimacy.
Risk taking: Describe how the project has responded to risks that threatened the achievement of results. Identify any new risks that have emerged since the last report. *(1500 character limit)*	All efforts to mitigate against the 'mainly resistance to change' which is at the core of the risk, was directed in enhancing the education of the primary security sector actors on the benefits of SSR for their aspirations in developing their lot professionally, especially for peace

	support operations. PSOs remains a great incentive for security sector personnel to stay disciplined and committed to the reforms processes as they look forward to deployment in such operations. At the political level, risks that threatened the achievement of the required momentum following the stalemate, have been tackled with focused advisory meetings on and off work centred on the expectations of the citizenry and the international community. Alluding to the aspirations of all stakeholders who have been inspired by the laudable approval of government to the reforms of the security sector, interlocutors are consistently reminded of the expectations which remain very high and demanding ever increasing efforts to achieve the ultimate goals.
Gender equality: In the reporting period, which activities have taken place with a specific focus on addressing issues of gender equality or women's empowerment? *(1500 character limit)*	The SSR Team has included a comprehensive training course of now 42 service personnel and women from Civil Socieity Organisations and government to enhance capacity of the security sector institutions on gender-responsive SSR. It is worth noting a three-level gender-responsive SSR training has is almost completed. In that, the basic and intermediate levels have been successfully completed whiles the advance (and last level) is set to complete in early July.. It is envisaged that a lot more women will be empowered after the capacity-building training is completed. A gender caravan has been commission to undertake a nation-wide tour to sensitize on gender mainstreaming, SGBV and HIV and AIDS awareness.all geared towards attaining a set of objective for capacitating the security sector with: 1)SSR Gender Specialists as Focal Persons in each of the 7 institutions: 2) Establishing a network of Women's focal persons across the sector, Civil Society and government; 3) Establish teams of subject matter speicialists to constiute the body of gender trainers to expand on overall capacity.
Other: Are there any other issues concerning project implementation that you want to share, including any capacity needs of the recipient organizations? *(1500 character limit)*	

1.3 INDICATOR BASED PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT: *Using the Project Results Framework as per the approved project document or any amendments- provide an update on the achievement of key indicators at both the outcome and output level in the table below (if your project has more indicators than provided in the table, select the most relevant ones with most relevant progress to highlight). Where it has not been possible to collect data on indicators, state this and provide any explanation. Provide gender and age disaggregated data. (300 characters max per entry)*

	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
Outcome 1 The SSR stakeholders benefit from the necessary strategic support to elaborate and implement an inclusive national security strategy	Indicator 1.1 A common national vision of security sector reform based on consultations with population (men and women in all regions) as well as continued dialogue with stakeholders	Absence of a dialogue with population and key stakeholders on SSR -Absence of a national SSR strategy which is being developped at this time	Population (men and women, all regions and ethnic groups) and key stakeholders are consulted on security needs and objectives for SSR - Existence of national SSR policy and strategy	On the NSP development, broad and inclusive country-wide consultations have been completed with representatives from all social groups including women and youth groups, local authorities and civil society organisations shaping the assessment of the context, challenges and security needs		
	Indicator 1.2					

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	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
	Indicator 1.3					
Output 1.1 Stakeholders (of the security sector) receive the necessary strategic support to develop and implement a national security sector reform strategy	Indicator 1.1.1 Availability of team providing strategic and technical support to develop SSR strategy	Baseline: No strategy in place	Target: Team of three experts operational by thrid quarter	The UN SSR Team now deployed comprising: Snr. SSR Adviser, SSR Specialist (national staff), Programme Management Assistant (national staff) working in collaboration with International SSR Advisers		
	Indicator 1.1.2 Detailed review/assessment of defense and security institutions	Baseline: No assessment/r eview of security sector exits/limited data on security sector exists	Target: Assessment of the entire security sector conducted (taking into account gender and human right	A comprehensive SSR assessment has been conducted and report submitted to government		

	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
Output 1.2 An inclusive and participatory national sector-wide approach of SSR ensured	Indicator 1.2.1 Office of National Security established	Baseline: Absence of ONS	Target: ONS established and functional	10-personnel start-up staff established as the nascent ONS		
	Indicator 1.2.2 a) Mechanism for broad and inclusive participation of all stakeholders in the design of a national security sector reform strategy/ Framework for a dialogue platform for all stakeholders involved in security sector established	Baseline: Absence of a dialogue with population and key stakeholders	Target: At least 5 meetings platform of dialogue with stakeholders and of national consultations (men and women, all regions) resulting in clear recommendations	Consultation meetings held in all the 5 regions and 2 Municipalities with men and women participants in all of them resulting in consolidated findings and recommendations for implementation		

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	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
Output 1.3						
	Indicator 1.3.1					
	Indicator 1.3.2					
Outcome 2 Support of the international community to the security sector reform is coherent and coordinated	Indicator 2.1 SSR is planned and implemented coherently and with coordinated support from international partners	Baseline: -Absence of coordination mechanism for SSR	Target: - Existence of a coordination mechanism for SSR - Existence resource mobilization strategy	International SSR support now coordinated through the forum of the International Advisory Group (IAG) which meets regularly to agree on common approach		
	Indicator 2.2					
	Indicator 2.3					
Output 2.1 Framework for coordinated and coherent	Indicator 2.1.1 Technical Committee for SSR support established and	Baseline: Absence of coordination structure on SSR for	Targets: - Technical Committee for SSR support	The technical committee for SSR support now exist in the form of the SSR International		

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
international support to the security sector is established and functional					
regular meetings held, at least 25% of Committee members are women	international partners	operational - At least 12 meetings held - a detailed mapping of all interventions in security sector is available	Advisory Group (IAG). Consideration is being given to the possibility of expanding it to include other stakeholders - both local and international actors. Regrettably the committee is yet to have any woman in it		
Indicator 2.1.2 Resource mobilization strategy for SSR developed and implemented	Baseline: Absence of strategy	Target: -Existence of resource mobilization strategy for SSR - Pledges by donors for implementatio n at sectoral level of SSR	While discussion have started with the National Think Tank for developing a resource mobilization strategy, this is yet to progress further No resource mobilization		

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Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
		strategy	strategy for SSR is not yet developed.		
Output 2.2					
Indicator 2.2.1					
Indicator 2.2.2					
Output 2.3					
Indicator 2.3.1					
Indicator 2.3.2					
Outcome 3					
Indicator 3.1					
Indicator 3.2					
Indicator 3.3					
Output 3.1					
Indicator 3.1.1					
Indicator 3.1.2					
Output 3.2					
Indicator 3.2.1					
Indicator 3.2.2					
Output 3.3					
Indicator 3.3.1					

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	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of project Indicator Target	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)	Adjustment of target (if any)
	Indicator 3.3.2					
Outcome 4	Indicator 4.1					
	Indicator 4.2					
	Indicator 4.3					
Output 4.1	Indicator 4.1.1					
	Indicator 4.1.2					
Output 4.2	Indicator 4.2.1					
	Indicator 4.2.2					
Output 4.3	Indicator 4.3.1					
	Indicator 4.3.2					

PART 2: INDICATIVE PROJECT FINANCIAL PROGRESS

2.1 Comments on the overall state of financial expenditures

Please rate whether project financial expenditures are on track, delayed, or off track, vis-à-vis project plans and by recipient organization: *on track*

How many project budget tranches have been received to date and what is the overall level of expenditure against the total budget and against the tranche(s) received so far (500 characters limit): Two tranches received. Delivery against overall budget is at 55%

When do you expect to seek the next tranche, if any tranches are outstanding:

If expenditure is delayed or off track, please provide a brief explanation (500 characters limit): Expenditure is is now picking up. expectation due to the EU assuming financial responsibility for the planned baseline study of the security sector.

Please state what $ amount was planned (in the project document) to be allocated to activities focussed on gender equality or women's empowerment and how much has been actually allocated to date: .30% of planned budget.

Please fill out and attach Annex A on project financial progress **with detail on expenditures/ commitments to date using the original project budget table in Excel**, even though the $ amounts are indicative only.

Annex D - PBF project budget

Note: If this is a budget revision, insert extra columns to show budget changes.

Table 1 - PBF project budget by Outcome, output and activity

Outcome/ Output number	Outcome/ output/ activity formulation:	Budget by recipient organization in USD - Please add a new column for each recipient organization	Percent of budget for each output reserved for direct action on gender equality (if any):	Level of expenditure/ commitments in USD (to provide at time of project progress reporting):	Level of commitments in USD (to provide at time of project progress reporting):	Any remarks (e.g. on types of inputs provided or budget justification, for example if high TA or travel costs)
OUTCOME 1:	Support the Office of the National Security Adviser and government to develop a National Security Policy and related policies. Support in the development of an implementation strategy					
Output 1.1:	Stakeholders supported to develop and implement a national security reform strategy and associated implementation plan of the sectoral reform process					
Activity 1.1.1:	Steering committee meetings; 1 per month to oversee the SSR process	1,500.00				
Activity 1.1.2:	1 Induction course for a 10-member drafting team supervised by 2 IAG members.	1,500.00	500.00			
Activity 1.1.3:	Drafting to develop the SSR Strategy; 10-member team consider zero draft; meet for 1 week every month of the first quarter	10,000.00				
Activity 1.1.4:	Facilitate a High-Level Government Retreat	5,000.00				
Output 1.2:	Individual institutional policies of the 8 security sector institutions (GAF, GPF, SIS, GID, GPS, NDLEAG, GFRS and GRA) developed					
Activity 1.2.1A:	Recruitment of Resource Persons; 2 resource persons to support the IAG in facilitating induction workshop and mentor drafting teams	35,000.00	1,000.00			
Activity 1.2.1B:	SSRS and NSS frameworks developed and NSP launching	50,000.00	5,000.00	6,207.77	27,038.86	
Activity 1.2.2:	Facilitate Technical support from ECOWAS, KAIPTC<ASSN and Brindisi to support development of individual institutional Security Policies 1 expert each: Military, Police, Prisons, Intelligence Immigration for 6 weeks technical support each	64,000.00		-		

Item	Description				
Activity 1.2.3:	1 Induction course for 8 security institutions x 5-member teams in developing individual institutional policies	5,000.00	500.00	643.58	
Activity 1.2.4:	Review and finalise drafts in a 1-week seminar	15,000.00			
Activity 1.2.5:	Printing of Individual Institutional Policies	10,000.00			
Activity 1.2.6:	Support the establishment and capacity building of the Office of the National Security (ONS) with a SSR gender-responsive consideration	15,000.00			
Activity 1.2.7:	Complete Gender-responsive SSR training to certify Gender SSR Experts across the security sector	20,000.00			
Output 1.3:	**Expand capacity building of the Office of National Security**			13,288.58	21,812.70
Activity 1.3.1:	Support Participation in international short courses in SSR/National Security for NSA and 2 ONS Staff	20,000.00			
Activity 1.3.2:	Operating and supplies cost in support of the Office of National Security (ONS) – office and stationery supplies, equipment and machinery, internet and communication connections, vehicle (fuel, maintenance and insurance) and impress	90,000.00		26,049.17	
Output 1.4:	**Expand on mentoring of the security sector leadership in the Gambia**				
Activity 1.4.1:	Support the NSA's monthly Coordinating meetings of the Heads of the security sector institutions	1,500.00			
Output 1.5:	**Support the development of institutional doctrines, rules, regulations, codes of conduct to enhance professionalism**				
Activity 1.5.1:	Support a 1-week sub-regional study tour of the security sector leadership comprising of 8 Chiefs: 2 PSs: 3 ONS Staff	75,000.00			
Output 1.6:	**A developed communication strategy available**				
Activity 1.6.1:	Support the development of a comprehensive communication strategy for SSR in collaboration with SSR Partners including the National Think Tank	20,000.00			
TOTAL $ FOR OUTCOME 1:					

Item	Description			
OUTCOME 2: Capacities of the justice delivery system oversight bodies defence and security enhanced				
Output 2.1:	Capacities of correction institutions enhanced for efficient service delivery			
Activity 2.2.1:	Support the capacity building of prisons officers in the rehabilitation and reintegration training of prisoners (with 30% women prisoners) international training in an African country	30,000.00	5,000.00	
TOTAL $ FOR OUTCOME 2:				
OUTCOME 3: Capacity Building of Rights Groups Organisations and CSOs in Gender and Human Rights				
Output 3.1:	Capacity of Human rights, advocacy groups -Civil society organisations women advocacy groups enhanced			
Activity 3.1.2:	Support development of gender focal groups across the security sector institutions / refresher course for gender experts within the individual security sector institutions	30,000.00	150.24	931.49
Activity 3.1.1:	Facilitate dialogues of rights and women's groups and few selected for grants to promote their advocacy and outreach work	10,000.00	5,000.00	
TOTAL $ FOR OUTCOME 3:				
OUTCOME 4: Support of international community is coherent and coordinated				
Output 4.1:	A framework for international support to the security sector is established and is coordinated, coherent and functional.			
Activity 4.1.1:	Provide support to regular meeting of the SSR partners group and the SSR focal persons	2,500.00		314.31
Activity 4.1.2:	Support the NSA in holding coordination meetings with government's International SSR partners	3,500.00		200.76
Activity 4.1.3:	Hold regular meetings at the technical level of SSR International partners and SSR Experts and support an SSR IAG Retreat to review support strategies on SSR	12,000.00		
Output 4.2:	A developed resource mobilisation strategy available by end 2019			
Activity 4.2.1:	Support the design and implementation of resource mobilisation strategy; includes short contracts of expert	22,000.00		
TOTAL $ FOR OUTCOME 4:				

13/6

			total project budget expended/committed	
Project personnel costs if not included in activities above	400,000.00		85,469.82	119,657.75
Project operational costs if not included in activities above				
Project M&E budget				
2nd tranche	420,000.00			
TOTAL EXPENDITURE / COMMITMENTS 2019			132,324.23	169,440.80
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 2017			210,862.93	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 2018			269,504.07	
GRAND TOTAL EXPENDITURE / COMMITMENTS TO DATE			612,691.23	169,440.80
SUB-TOTAL PROJECT BUDGET:	1,297,100.00			
Indirect support costs (7%):	102,900.00	GMS 7%	42,888.39	11,860.86
TOTAL PROJECT BUDGET:	1,400,000.00		665,579.62	181,301.66

Kellie Conteh, SSR Advisor, Signature............................ Date...19/6/19

Aïssata De, UNDP Resident Coordinator, Signature............................ Date.......13/05/13

Ndella Faye-Colley, PBF Secretariat Coordinator, Signature............................ Date.......13/6/9

Seraphine Wakana, UN Resident Coordinator, Signature............................ Date....... 13/06/19

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

OF

THE GAMBIA 2019

His Excellency

Mr. Adama Barrow
President of The Republic of The Gambia
Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces

FOREWORD

The Gambia's maiden National Security Policy (NSP) is the product of a long, collaborative effort initiated from My Office as the President of the Republic of the Gambia. It was prepared at the Office of National Security under the supervision of the SSR Steering Committee chaired by my Vice President. It is the result of the combined and meticulous efforts of Gambians and international partners. I wish to recognize the contributions of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), and the United States of America (USA). My special thanks goes to the Drafting Committee assembled from key Security Institutions and the Editorial Team who painstakingly worked to produce this comprehensive document. This is the first National Security Policy ever produced in The Gambia. It is an overarching policy document that aims at streamlining mandates, roles and responsibilities of Security Institutions. It is my desire that the NSP will engender a clear division of labour that would serve the nation and its citizens in our march towards building a better Gambia.

H. E Mr. Adama Barrow
President of The Republic of The Gambia
Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces

Date: 09/05/19

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Rising popular expectations for a streamlined, cohesive, participatory, civilian-controlled and transparent National Security Policy (NSP), for the Gambia, predicated on human-security is a timely and necessary endeavor. A first of its kind since independence in 1965, the Gambia's new NSP spells out key roles, responsibilities, and mandates of vital security institutions, organs, agencies, and personnel in order to reconfigure the security sector to meet evolving national state and human-security needs, challenges, risks and opportunities well into the next decade of the Twenty-first Century. Fundamental to achieving this is a foreign-policy pivot that prioritizes Gambia-Senegal relations to strengthen existing bilateral agreements to secure porous national borders, defend maritime boundaries, as well as explore existing and future resource discoveries for mutual gain. Addressing gender, youth, and social inequality, nationally, while leveraging the Gambia's "soft-power" regionally and globally to mitigate environmental, cyber security, "radicalization" money-laundering and other challenges multilaterally, bodes well for the "New Gambia," and its security institutions. Yet crucial to the success of the Gambia's new NSP, is popular ownership and changed perceptions that long gone are the days when the security sector was an instrument in the hands of political actors who utilized it to deny Gambians of their fundamental rights, and for self-aggrandizement of the highest order.

The Gambia's NSP positions the country and its security services to meet changing human security needs of Gambians. And, by spelling out the division of labor among the three branches of government and their oversight functions, the Gambia's new NSP will avail itself to periodic review and evaluation to reflect changing national, regional and global dynamics. Resulting institutionalized checks and balances to strengthen various security service responsiveness will make for a cohesive policy-strategy which at its core is driven by Security Sector Reform (SSR) principles in pursuit of human and national security."

ABBREVATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

CED - Custom and Excise Department

CSO - Civil Society Organizations

DLEAG - Drug Law Enforcement Agency

ECOSOCC - Economic, Social and Cultural Council

EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

GAF - Gambia Armed Forces

GBoS - Gambia Bureau of Statistics

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GFRS - Gambia Fire and Rescue Services

GG – Gambia Government

GID - Gambia Immigration Department

GPF - Gambia Police Force

GPS - Gambia Prison Services

GRA - Gambia Revenue Authority

HE – His Excellency

HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IFIs - International Financial Institutions

IUU - Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated

MoD - Ministry of Defence,

MoFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoFEA – Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

MoI – Ministry of Interior

MoICI – Ministry of Information and Communication Infrastructure

MoJ – Ministry of Justice

NA - National Assembly

NDP - National Development Plan

NDSC - National Deficit Syndrome Culture

NSA - National Security Adviser

NSC - National Security Council

NSP – National Security Policy

PBF- Peace Building Fund

SGVB - Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIS - State Intelligence Service

SSR - Security Sector Reform

TVCR - Threats, Vulnerabilities, Challenges and Risks

UN - United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

CHAPTER ONE: THE FOUNDATIONS

BACKGROUND

1.   The protection of the State as well as the promotion of human security and the core values from which they emerge remain the single most important responsibility of any responsible government. They are in turn inextricably linked to economic stability, adequate resources, good governance and social cohesion. Twenty-two years of dictatorial rule in the Gambia effectively eroded government capacity to protect the citizens, derailed economic development efforts, and undermined core national values, in part, because the security sector was used as a tool for political repression.

2.   In the aftermath of The Gambia's December 2016 presidential election and assumption of the presidency by H.E. Adama Barrow there was a clear need for a new people-centered national security policy to address Gambia's glaring security deficit. With support from the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Fund (PBF) Security Sector Reform (SSR) a thorough assessment was undertaken in consultation with the general public and relevant development partners. The resulting Security Sector Assessment Report, December 2017, highlighted the need for a security policy and a civilian-controlled security sector founded on democratic institutions, norms and processes to promote human rights and rule of law. In light of changing domestic and global security landscape where emphasis has now shifted from National to Human Security, Gambia needs a well-crafted and clearly articulated National Security Policy that is predicated on popular participation, and international best practices. The President simultaneously serving as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense is common practice in The Gambia. In the last two decades,The Gambia witnessed saw blatant abuse of Gambians and use of the state security apparatus primarily for political repression and self-interest. This culminated in a culture of silence and of impunity, which in turn severely eroded public trust and confidence in the security services. The New Face of Gambia's Security Policy seeks to reverse negative public perceptions of the security services to engender confidence and regain public trust in this vital sector.

3.   However, the Gambia's national security objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a transparent and accountable government. It is important that the state takes appropriate measures

to safeguard people's socio-economic security. These include but are not limited to the following: access to quality education, vocational training, job creation, improved energy sector, access to justice, food security, viable financial sector, industrialization, infrastructural development, improved public safety and emergency response preparedness.

NATIONAL (CORE) VALUES

4.   Gambians place high premium on the following core values among others:

    4.1.   Faith in their Creator,

    4.2.   Love of the family,

    4.3.   Integrity;

    4.4.   Internal Peace , communal peace, self-respect, human rights and the dignity of persons,

    4.5.   National unity, and

    4.6.   Religious and ethnic tolerance.

5.   It is these shared values and principles that form the bedrock of Gambian culture, yet Gambian culture is not monolithic. It is the sum-total of various sub-cultures and, in a rapidly changing global security landscape propelled by shifting economic, technological and cultural changes. The Gambia's core national valuesare changing at an unprecedented pace. These could pose potential threats to national unity.

6.   As a result of these therefore, Gambians have a collective responsibility and role to play when it comes to securing the nation. Building a security system that is ready to detect, deter and

defeat any eventualities in an inclusive manner is of paramount importance. This is fundamental to protecting the country's national security interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

7.   The Gambia's overarching national interests lie in the prosperity and wellbeing of her peoples and the socio-economic transformation of the country. Such an interest is contingent on national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, as a sovereign nation, the Gambia is committed to global peace, interdependence, security, stability and peaceful resolution of conflict. Similarly, the Gambia's peaceful existence and strengthening of the "Special Relationship" with its neighbors, is not only a foreign policy priority but a national interest as well. Shared cultural values, geo-political contiguity and socio-economic and common cultural interests make relations with its neighbor, vitally important.

NATIONAL POWER

8.   The Gambia's national power include: Diplomacy, the Economy, National Cohesion, Information Communication Technologies, and Military/security Preparedness. These are fundamental to defending the country's national interests. These attributes of national power will serve as vehicles to achieving national goals and interests both internally and externally. Therefore, the Gambia's ability to advance its national interests is largely dependent on the effective use of the above-mentioned instruments to achieve National Strategic Objectives. The elements of National Power are enumerated below:

    8.1.   **Diplomacy.** It is the principal instrument that The Gambia uses to engage with other states or foreign bodies to advance its values, interests and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for socio-economic advancement. Considering its national interest for peace and security within the state and outside its borders, the Gambian government will primarily use diplomacy:

        8.1.1.   To settle any dispute through negotiation and other peaceful means.

8.1.2. To promote mutual respect and cooperation between states in order to reduce tension and potential for conflict within and outside the region.

8.1.3. To integrate defense, security and intelligence in foreign policy activities and engagements.

8.2. **Economy.**The Gambia operates not as an island but as part of the global political-economy. It is primarily a market-driven economy. Due to its small size, which is externally-dependent, and as a producer of primary commodities, the Gambia's economy is vulnerable to external shocks. Its economic behavior is shaped largely by the behavior of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and the goodwill of International Partners and multinational corporations. To address this deeply embedded dependency, it is important that agriculture, marine resources, and tourism be well managed with great amount of prudence. This is vital if the country would enhance employment opportunities especially for young people, as well as propel economic growth and development. Prudent and effective use of Gambia's natural and human resources could position the country well to become an attraction for foreign direct investment. The ultimate objective would be to enhance competitiveness, explore the untapped resources that the country is endowed with, and reduce the country's vulnerability to external shocks and the vagaries of dependency.

8.3. **National Cohesion**. Gambia believe in fostering co-existence to enforce family ties and values and the infusion of social cohesion. There exists strong willingness of Gambians to cooperate with one another to promote national security objectives and to unite to promote economic advancement. Religious tolerance and ethnic harmony have, likewise, contributed positively to promoting national cohesion, and the maintenance of peace and security in the country. In the interest of national cohesion and harmony, it is crucially important that government assures religious minorities, that they remain

important and contributing members of society. Promoting Inter-faith dialogue among Christians and Muslims could allay mutual fears and break walls based on ignorance. Furthermore, it is in the Gambia's vital national interest to curb rising ethnic, and religious chauvinism ("tribalism") to avert inter-ethnic, as well as inter-religious conflict. These are looming threats that must not be overlooked.

8.4. <u>Information and Communication</u>

8.4.1. Technological globalization in the Twenty-first Century is advancing at an accelerated pace. It is pushing countries to not only keep abreast with these changes but harness them to protect, and promote vital national security interests both internally and globally. The Internet offers the Gambia numerous opportunities for better communication, and effective coordination of security and vital intelligence gathering instruments. Use of these technologies for monitoring and information gathering have the additional benefit of keeping policy-makers informed about threats and latest international best practices in the security sector. These technologies could also play a catalytic role in promoting national economic development.

8.4.2. Paradoxically, these same technologies could become instruments of crime and terrorism. Modern technology can present clear dangers to the Gambia's national security and cohesion. Misinformation and disinformation via social media, remain a potential national threat. Care must be exercised, therefore, in dealing with these potential threats to safeguard national, sectoral and institutional interests. It is, therefore, critical for The Gambia to keep abreast with these global technological innovations. However, this technological innovations

are very useful platforms to enhance communication among Gambians.

8.5. **Defence and Security**

8.5.1.   This instrument is by far the most crucial among attributes of national power. It refers to the defense and security posture capable to successfully resist and repel hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. This instrument of the Gambia's national power is obviously not limited to the Armed Forces. A well-structured and managed defence and security sector with clear delineations of competencies and definition of mandates will contribute to the achievement of peace and security as part of the national interest.

8.5.2.   In addition to their primary constitutional mandates, the Gambia will use its Armed and Security Services to strengthen the country's participation in the UN, AU, and ECOWAS and Peace Support Operations in other parts of the World. Through defense and security agreements,international conventions and obligations, the Gambia should carve a niche of its own to boost professionalism, training and expertise of its security services.   If effectively and adequately leveraged this could give the Gambia a vital platform to advance its interest, globally.

OPPORTUNITIES

9. **Political Will.**The Gambia more than any other time in its existence, has never enjoyed greater goodwill from the international community. The new government's commitment to a culture of tolerance, democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights, augur well for the country's future. If this goodwill is squandered for lack of effective policy directives and vision, it could evaporate and plunge the country into further economic difficulties.

10. **Youth Mobilization.**More than half of the Gambia's population are youth under the age of 25.This represents a huge potential human resource that could be used advantageously to foster growth and development of the country. Indeed, to realize this potential resource, youth must have better access to education, health care, and financial resources. A well-articulated Youth Policy that address the perennial neglect of this demography could make the difference in the life of The Gambians. For too long, youth have not featured prominently in national policy, or when they did, it was an afterthought. Their integration and inclusion of issues pertaining to youth, is well overdue.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

11. **Global and Regional Outlook**

    11.1.   Polarization along economic, ethnic, religious, regional, and other fault lines has often resulted in national disintegration with adverse effects on human, national and global security. These have led to rising numbers of internally displaced populations, irregular migration, human-trafficking, terrorism, money-laundering, organized crime, and other global human security challenges. Indeed, these represent the new frontiers of national and global security threats and challenges in the first two decades of the Twenty-first Century.

11.2.	Additionally, rise in insurgency, extremism and radicalized groups have occasioned a more violent global society. This has irreversibly altered the theatre and techniques of conventional war more significantly into non-conventional forms. Thus, perceptions about the utility of force as a technique of conflict resolution has given way to the proposition that constructing sustainablepolitical and democratic institutions are, in the end, a more enduring basis for peace and development.

## 12.	**National Geo-political Situation**

12.1.	Located on the West Coast of Africa, The Gambia has a total land area of about 11,300 square kilometres. It is surrounded by its much larger neighbour Senegal, with a land border of 748km except on its80km Atlantic coastline. The Gambia's maritime spacecovers 12 nautical miles of territorial waters with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (equivalent to 142000 km^2).The continental shelf of the Gambia is about 3900 km^2 (equivalent to 14% of the total combined shelf area of The Gambia and Senegal).

12.2.	Consequently, in order, to protect the Gambia's sovereignty, and interest, adherence to old and new security agreements with Senegal is necessary. Though with few existential external threats, it is of paramount importance for the Gambia to strengthen its national security through joint-security arrangements with Senegal and through International partners support especially in areas ofland, air and sea border control and management. This renewed joint-security arrangement could promote the Gambia's re-export trade, reduce Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in our waters and other related cross-border crimes.

12.3.	Closer security ties with Senegal are importantto protectThe country's maritime spaces and borders. Therefore, there is an urgent need, as well as an opportunity to establish a common maritime policy between the Gambia and Senegal to

collectively pursue and protect mutually beneficial interests. This can help to mitigate current and likely future disputes over maritime resources and new natural resource discoveries.

12.4. The Gambia,is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious country with well over twelve ethnic groups with English as its official language. According to the 2013 Gambia Bureau of Statistics Report, the country has a population of approximately 1,882,450.

12.5. According to GBOS (2013)Muslims constitute about 90% of the population with approximately 9% Christians and 1% other faiths. It is in the national security interest of the Gambia tostrengthen existing socio-cultural fluidity across ethnic, religious and political lines as well as to avert social dislocation.

12.6. Fluid inter-ethnic relations underpinned by healthy "joking" relationships remain one of Gambia's, as well as Senegal's major strengths. This serves as asocial mechanismthat help to mitigate potential ethnic and communal conflict. It is therefore important, for both governments to simultaneously pursue policies and practices that promote, inter-state, inter-ethnic harmony and patriotism and avoid macro-nationalist sentiments.

13. **The Socio-Economic Landscape**

13.1. According to the2015/16 Integrated Household Survey conducted by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the proportion of the Gambian population living below the poverty line is onthe increase. The Poverty Index increased slightly from 48.1 percent in 2010 to 48.6 percent in 2015. While this increase is considered statistically insignificant, poverty rate increased substantially by 18.2 percent from 0.79 million in 2010 to 0.94 million in 2015.

13.2. In spite of favorable conditions for food production to meet the needs of the people in The Gambia, the country is still proneto food insecurity. Estimates based on the 2015/16 Integrated Household Survey suggest that close to 55 percent of the population cannot meet the daily required minimum calories of 2400 per day per person.

13.3. Fifty Five percent of Gambians live in the urban area while 45% live in the rural area. This high urban concentration explains the congestion and overcrowding in the urban area with its attendance, problems. Overcrowding leads to emergence of illegal structures and settlements which have implications on safety and security in the urban areas.

13.4. The overall contribution of agriculture to GDP growth has been on the decline since 2010. This is traceable to factors such as climate shocks leading to food shortages. This trend has made peasant farmers economically vulnerable. High fertility in the country, which is the cause of the population growth rate of 3.2% per annum, might have been the cause of the rapid increase in poverty rate. There is the need for crafting of policies that will boost economic growth and ensure food security for all citizens.

13.5. UNDP findings support the fact that the country registers high levels of unemployment and under-employment, with 40% of women and 20% of men falling into this bracket. This has raised the level of vulnerability to crime and radicalization as well as the incidence of gender-based violence and gender inequality. Irregular migration and substance abuse have also tended to increase. Unequal access to resources such as land for agriculture and construction which favors men, perpetuates pre-existing disparities between men and women. Only a small percentage of Gambian women hold strategic positions in both the private and public sectors, and in particular the security sector.

13.6.   In spite of the negative indices of unemployment, irregular migration and unequal access to resources, tourism, construction and telecommunication sectors contribute significantly to the national economy. Revenuefrom these sectors in 2016, accounted for about 22% of GDP. There are reports of oil and other natural resource deposits in The Gambia, but the country is yet to benefit from them economically as initial exploration of SAMO 1 (offshore oil well), the first well to be drilled, did not meet commercial expectations. There is the need to continue exploration of all-natural resource deposit in The Gambia.

The Security Environment

13.7.   The security instruments used and applied during the colonial era had continued in post-independence Gambia and was used to model or shape the security institutions. This explains why security was designed to focus on the protection of the political and economic interests of the elite as opposed to meeting the needs of the citizenry. This situation continued into the First Republic, worsening during the second republic.

13.8.   After the change of government in 1994, The Gambian security forces were less adequately prepared for the real and emerging security challenges within the country. When not being used for regime security, they were merely oriented to execute routine procedures in the barracks. This, coupled with professional stagnation and bad governance rooted in corruption, rivalry among service/agency institutions and political patronage, negatively impacted their integrity, capacity, and professionalism.

13.9.   In the Second Republic, the President abuse his power as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence and made himself sole policy and decision-maker for the Armed and Security services. Appointments to key positions and elevation to higher ranks were mostly based on nepotism and personal loyalties. There was

also a dark chapter in the Gambia's security sector that needs further unveiling to engender national healing and glean important lessons from this troubled legacy.

13.10. Such legacies, even long after colonial rule ended, remained entrenched. In fact, the former President of the second republic perpetuated the culture as a tool to entrench himself in power. As a result, the new political leadership, following the national polls in December 2016 inherited a security apparatus that was not oriented to meet the needs of the people.

13.11. In addition, there were instances of widespread human rights abuse and a culture of impunity perpetrated by elements of the security sector. This has led to the erosion of public trust and confidence. This security lapse resulted in many human rights abuses orchestrated with impunity by the authorities who were supposed to defend and protect the people and act in accordance with the law. Important lessons have been gleaned from the dark days of dictatorial rule that include the following:

13.11.1. It is vital that comprehensive training modules for security personnel, including gender mainstreaming, international conventions on Human and People's Rights, as well as an outreach program to enlighten security personnel will be most important in changing attitudes towards human rights concerns;

13.11.2. Another lesson learnt is, vibrant national security in the Gambia, is contingent upon political order, good governance, effective foreign policy and true democracy. These national security objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a transparent and accountable government;

13.11.3.   To be proficient and effective, the security sector must possess standard structures, quality personnel, modern equipment and sufficient resources necessary to respond to the legitimate security needs of the state andcitizens;

13.11.4.   Furthermore, this transformation process requires unambiguous and transparent strategy to facilitate smooth interaction, coordination and cooperation between security sector actors consistent with constitutional roles and responsibilities, and,

13.11.5.   Consequently, unlike the traditional regime-centered approach to security in the Gambia, the modern concept should focus more on human-security as the basis for an enlightened national security policy. This is important for the reasons enumerated below.

BROAD STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

14.   Inspired by our national security vision and interests, the objectives of this national security policy are to:

14.1.   Protect The Gambia's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

14.2.   Present The Gambia's positive image and prestige regionally and globally.

14.3.   Promote socio-economic development and prosperity;

14.4.   Ensure empowerment and equal participation of women in the decision-making processes, including at the strategic level.

14.5.	Conduct security sector reform to ensure efficient and effective governance and oversight of the security system as well as to ensure the definition of mandates and delineation of competencies of security forces, services and institutions.

14.6.	Enhance the cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the Security Forces and agencies for seamless interoperability bythe establishment of a National Joint Operation Center for internal and external operation.

14.7.	Enhance the cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the Intelligence agencies for seamless interoperability bythe establishment of a National Joint Intelligence Operation Center for coordination of all intelligence activities.

14.8.	Enhance the peace time role of the Armed forces and Security Services through the development of their productive potential.

14.9.	Participate and contribute to global and regional peace and security.

14.10.	To have a structured and professional Armed and Security Services that is proportionate to the security needs of the Gambia.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

15.	The Gambia's National Security Policy and conduct of its international relations shall be guided by the following principles:

15.1.	Protection of national sovereignty and independence

15.2.	Promotion of national ownership, responsibility and commitment.

15.3.   Fostering national unity and integration by developing a security sector which is fully representative of Gambians and promotes the welfare and prosperity of all persons in The Gambia.

15.4.   Promotion of human security that is responsive to the security and justice needs of The Gambian people.

15.5.   Promotion of democratic principles of good governance, accountability and the rule of law.

15.6.   Respect for Human rights and mainstreaming gender issues in all aspects of governance including the recruitment, retention, full participation in decision-making and training curriculum of all security institutions.

15.7.   Ensuring civilian oversight and democratic control of the security sector in line with international standards of human rights and the rule of law including parliamentary approval of security legislation.

15.8.   Approving states of emergency, security sector budget, and inviting the Heads of Security Agencies for testimonies when necessary.

15.9.   Ensuring the delineation of competencies between different security services, such as between the defence and internal security forces and services, excluding militarization of the police and the interference of the Armed Forces in internal/public security and safety, except supportive roles when the need arises.

15.10.   Exclusion of perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the security sector through vetting and selection procedures.

15.11.   Ensuring the separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers;

15.12. Ensuring access to justice and right to security for people in The Gambia.

15.13. Be guided by Public Finance Management (PFM) principles, including the affordability of the security sector and its balanced budget in relation to other public sectors.

15.14. Fostering respect for the constitution, international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

15.15. Integration of informal and customary security providers and traditional justice actors into SSR processes where appropriate.

15.16. Integration of the goals and principles of international and regional organizations which The Gambia is a signatory.

15.17. Adoption of international principles of transparency and inclusiveness.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ASPIRATION

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

16.   The Gambia's overarching national interests lie in the prosperity and wellbeing of her peoples and the socio-economic transformation of the country. Such an interest is contingent on our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

17.   Furthermore, the Gambia as a bastion of peace and tolerance desires, as a sovereign nation, to effectively participate in the promotion of global peace, security, stability and integration. Equally desirous is to foster deep-rooted commitment to an unbreakable special bond and peaceful coexistence with the country's neighbors.

THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, CHALLENGES AND RISKS ASSESSMENT(TVCR)

18.   The Gambia's population is confronted with a range of TVCR that have direct impact on security. These include: poverty, unemployment, social and economic inequality, low and uncompetitive wages, inadequate education, limited access to health care, limited access to justice, and food insecurity. Also, the country's bulging and under-utilized or unemployed youth population and the inability of the private sector to grow or launch business ventures represents a vulnerability and a risk. The worst-case scenario is the combined effects of all these threats occurring at the same time, which has the potential of causing civil unrest,youths engaging in irregular migration, and in all sorts of crime, including theft, drug abuse, sexual violence, possession of small arms and light weapons and murder.

19.   **Disputed Land Borders**

> 19.1.   The distortion of the demarcation of the Senegal-Gambia borders inherited at independence pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. According to the Security Sector Assessment Report, The Gambia and Senegal have had tensions over border issues. Residents of the affected areas repeatedly disagree on land ownership and possession rights. Over the years, bilateral diplomatic

efforts have been made to resolve this issue, which led to the establishment of the "Senegalo-Gambia Boundary Commission" under the auspices of the 'Senegalo-Gambian Secretariat.' This Commission has already conducted preliminary assessment aimed at finding a permanent solution. However, the recommendations are yet to be implemented. If the situation is not duly addressed, it could result to renewed tensions that could severely undermine the harmony between the two countries.

19.2. The vast and sparsely monitored border between the Gambia and Senegal, coupled with the lack of capacity of the security operatives to effectively curb mounting crime rates, (such as armed banditry, sanctuary for dissident groups, robbery and wide spread cultivation and supply of cannabis) represent challenges or risks. The Casamance insurgency along the border could spill over into the border communities which may provoke a pursuit of these insurgents into the Gambia by the Senegalese security forces. Porous and poorly monitored borders are a recipe for transnational crime.

20. **Political Threat**

20.1. Partisan political threats that include political violence, politicizing traditional leadership institutions, (chiefdoms and Alkaloship) and risks of political violence remain real and must be addressed head on. Accordingly, the Security Sector is at risk of political polarization, especially, when past patron-client relationships seep into the new political dispensation. In addition, complications and regime risks and vulnerability will likely intensify if security personnel sympathetic to the former president possess large caches of weapons and ammunition. These combined with ethnic-based loss of ill-gotten favors, preferences and privileges are a lethal recipe for national fragmentation.

21. **Organized Trans- National and Cross- Border Crimes**

21.1. Organized transnational crimes such as "terrorism, "human" and "drug-trafficking, "smuggling," and "money-laundering" within the African continent are emerging challenges for the Gambia's security. Recent terror attacks in the sub-region make terrorism and insurgency a real threat to the country's security. Although, the country has not experienced a terror attack yet, the rising terror tendencies in the region poses a huge security challenge particularly to the tourism sector. This could adversely impact tourists and investors.

21.2. Therefore, there is the need to effectively operationalize the Joint Security Pact between the Gambia and Senegal to stem cross-border criminal activities, as well as address the right of hot pursuit. A Joint Integrated Bilateral-national Border Management Structure between the security institutions to deal with illegal cross border activities is vital.

22. **Human Rights and Justice**

22.1. Further delays to set up a mechanism for dealing with members of the past regime accused of committing atrocities has resulted in deep-seated grievances amongst sections of the civilian population. Importantly, alleged perpetrators still actively involved in the security sector must be brought to account for alleged crimes in a strengthened Transitional Justice Process to ensure accountability and justice.

22.2. Similarly, the manner in which security sector personnel handle disaffected groups that violently express grievances through acts of public disorder can have serious implications on national cohesion. The increased level of political and social awareness now enjoyed in the democratic opening of the New Gambia represent both an opportunity and a challenge.

23. **Gender Discrimination and Violence**

23.1. The Gambia like many other countries is a male-dominated society with social constructs that inhibits the development of women and girls. However during the years, issues of women have been .

23.2. Notwithstanding the Government's recognition of the constitutional requirements of gender mainstreaming and making use of all available talents pursuant to section 28 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, a lot more needs to be done to bring women up to par in politics, especially in the National Assembly, high-powered civil-servant jobs, the security sector and professions. Resolution 1325 of the UN General Assembly also calls for women participation in the maintenance of global peace and security. It is vitally important, therefore, to recruit women and marginalized men into the security services and also introduce training modules that focus on different conceptualizations of "security"informed by women's perspectives.

23.3. The notion that women's rights are human rights must filter up to the service brass, who in turn, must insist upon it in their specific institutions. Women in the security services must also be availed the space to express, without fear of retribution, their thoughts and concerns on a range of issues that include, but not limited to: pay, promotion, respect,and institutionalized bias (sexism). All security institutions must re-examine "old-boy" networks, reassess women's "gendered roles" within their institutions, and train personnel accordingly to shed entrenched attitudes and practices.

24. **Health**

24.1. The occurrence and re-occurrence of infections and diseases such as malaria, cholera, child/ Infant and maternal mortality, Ebola and the scourge of HIV/AIDS infections is a grave security concern for the state considering the

porosity of the Gambia's borders coupled with the weak capacity to respond to disease outbreaks. These epidemics have had serious negative impact on the country's tourism industry. The 2015 Ebola outbreakin some neighbouring countries (Manu River Union) shows evidence of the impact caused.

24.2. The upsurge of life-threatening diseases such as cancer, diabetics and hypertension also pose serious security challenges relative to the lives and productivity of the work force. Effective control requires strengthening the national surveillance and response systems. There is need for the Security sector in collaboration with both local and international health care agencies and research institutions to develop appropriate capacity for intervention.

25. **Environment**

25.1. It is of paramount importance for the Gambia to strengthen its national security environment, through joint-security arrangements with Senegal and the support of International partners especially in the areas of land, air and sea border management and control.

25.2. The indiscriminate cutting of trees for both economic and domestic use coupled with unregulated and uncontrolled fishing and mining, and bush fires has resulted in the destruction of the environment. This has endangered the flora and fauna of the country as well as human habitation. It is now generally agreed that human activity is largely responsible for climate change. In the Gambia's case this has resulted in erratic rainfall patterns that negatively impact on sustainable agricultural activities leading to scarcity of resources, which pose a threat to national security.

25.3. Human activities should be controlled to minimize the destruction of the environment. The effects of global warming and environmental degradation are the direct consequences of human activities.

25.4. To effectively deal with these threats, there is need for the government to adopt effective information dissemination strategies to enlighten the public about the environmental rules and regulations. Through these, government could help minimize the threats of deforestation and other detrimental environmental effects or consequences.

MARITIME SECURITY

25.5. It is important to protect maritime spaces and borders. Therefore, there is an urgent need to formulate and implement a maritime policy and strategy for the Gambia to promote, pursue, and protect her re-export trade, reduce Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and other related cross-border maritime crimes. This can help to mitigate current and likely future disputes over maritime resources and new natural resource discoveries

NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

26. To be a nation that will have a professional and apolitical security system able to protect the country and its people in line with fundamental human rights and rule of law, and a security system that will become empowered and motivated to defend national sovereignty against all forms of threats, committed to contributing to the building of peace, national unity, tolerance and social cohesion, and promoting respect for diversity and equal opportunities irrespective of gender, age, ability, ethnicity and religion in the interest of socio-economic development and prosperity.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS

27. The Gambia's NSP should strive to establish linkages between the National Assembly, the Constitution, National Development Plan (NDP), International Covenants and other legally binding national instruments. Sequencing the Gambia's NSP policy/strategy and legislation, to ensure that it is aligned with national priorities, and are realistic in terms of the national capacity required to support and implement it, is of great importance.

28.   The Gambia has eight security institutions, all of which have their primary and secondary mandates to maintain peace, security and the territorial integrity of the country. Without prejudices to the under mentioned mandates which they currently have, there is need to review the existing legal frameworks and align them to the current national security realities of the Gambia.

29.   There is also need to provide a legal framework for the National Security Council.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS

30.   <u>National Security Council (NSC).</u>

30.1.   The NSC, chaired by the president, is the highest authority for providing strategic guidance and direction in national security issues. To make it more effective, the composition of the NSC should include the membership of the policy makers of key institutions of the instruments of National power, such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and, Information and Communication Infrastructure.

30.2.   With the establishment of the Office of National Security which will provide secretarialservice for the NSC and coordinate Security Sector activities, this will enhance the oversight function of the NSC.

31.   <u>Office of National Security (ONS)</u>

31.1.   The Office of National Security will essentially be performing the following tasks:

31.1.1.   Act as the executive secretariat of the National Security Council and carrying out regular secretariat duties for the NSC

31.1.2.   Developing regular briefings and papers for NSC meetings

31.1.3.   Keeping the chairman of the NSC (The President) informed of emerging issues and assessments that require the council's attention.

31.1.4.   Analyzing the security environment – both internal and external – to be reported regularly to the NSC so that it can take informed decisions.

31.1.5.   Coordinating security sector activities to ensure that the directives and decisions emanating from the NSC are implemented; and that timely feedback from the sector is presented to apprise the NSC of developments.

31.1.6.   Generating periodic reports for the NSC on the basis of decisions of previous meeting of the Council

31.1.7.   Coordinating intelligence agencies to deliver joint assessments and, ensuring the veracity of assessed intelligence.

31.1.8.   Coordinating and supporting Joint Inter Departmental, Inter Agency and Multi National operations.

31.1.9.   Developing and monitoring the implementation and evaluation (Management) of the National Security Policy;

31.1.10.   The management of all national security related policies and strategies.

31.1.11.   The development of Integrated National Security Outcome Base Plans for the Short and Medium term.

31.1.12.   Report on quarterly and annual basis on the achievements and expenditure of the security sector.

31.1.13. Responsible for the management of the SSR Process in the security sector that include the Management (Policy development, review, monitor and evaluation) of the SSR policy.

31.1.14. Responsible for the management of the national security planning process.

31.1.15. Provide strategic direction guidelines for the security sector for the Short and Medium Term.

31.1.16. Responding to any other needs identified by the President and NSC.

32. **Statutory Organs of theNSC**

32.1. The next layer in the governance of the security sector shall be at the Office of the President and ministerial level. The Office of the President, ministries of Defence and Interior have the primary responsibility to manage and administer the defence and security institutions and hence should be established with the requisite administrative, technical and operational competence. Each sector should be able to develop and review policies/strategies for military defence, intelligence and internal security.

32.2. In view of the NSP as the overarching concept encompassing the national defence and internal security and related strategies, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)will define the national defence strategy related to the sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ministry of Interior will establish the internal security concept and strategy towards ensuring effective Law Enforcement, and the protection of livesand property.

32.3. The Ministry of Defence will manage the Defence Council and define relevant strategies, whilst the Ministry of Interior manages internal security issues and strategies within the established councils of the respective security institutions.

Consequently, this policy directs the establishment of Security Service Councils/Boards which will provide governance and oversight of the respective security institutions on matters relating to appointment, promotions and dismissal.

32.4.   The other statutory ministries of the NSC, namely Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Information and Communication Infrastructure are to perform significant role in pursuit of national security. These six (6) Ministries including Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior will constitute the first level of civil authority over national security matters. All other ministries in government are to ensure that their policies and activities are consistent with the pursuit of national interests.

MANDATES OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND SERVICES

33.   The Gambia has eight security institutions, all of which have their primary and secondary mandates to maintain peace, security and the territorial integrity of the country. Without prejudice to the under-mentioned mandates which they currently have, there is need to review the existing legal frameworks and align them to the current national security needs. Hence the need for a cultural change in the security sector requires shifting attention from the traditional regime-centric approach to the concept of modern security, which focuses on human security as the basis for national security. The quality of training for the security sector will ultimately determine the output, behavior and level of professionalism.

33.1.   **The Gambia Armed Forces (GAF)**

33.1.1.   According to the 1997 Constitution, Section 186, the Armed Forces of the Gambia consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by an Act of the National Assembly.

33.1.2. According to section 187 of the 1997 constitution, the principal functions of GAF are:

33.1.2.1. To preserve and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of The Gambia;

33.1.2.2. To aid the civil authority at their request, in emergencies and in case of natural disasters; and;

33.1.2.3. To engage at the request of civil authorities, in productive activities such as agriculture, engineering, health, and education for the development of the Gambia.

33.1.2.4. The National Youth Service shall be organized with co-operation and assistance of the Armed Forces

33.1.2.5. The Armed Forces shall establish training program for their members at all levels to equip them with skills and trades, and a program of secondment to civilian occupations, so as to enable members of the Forces to return, after their service, to a full and productive civilian life.

33.2. **The Gambia Police Force (GPF)**

33.2.1. The GPF was established under section 178 of The 1997 Constitution which defines the powers of the police as follows:

33.2.1.1. The preservation of law and order;

33.2.1.2.	Protection of life and property;

33.2.1.3.	The prevention and detection of crime;

33.2.1.4.	The apprehension of offenders and;

33.2.1.5.	The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged with.

33.2.1.6.	Oversee the implementation of private security act, supervision of all private security companies and training of personnel of private security company.

33.3. **State Intelligence Service (SIS)**

33.3.1.	The National Intelligence Agency (To beState Intelligence Service) was established by Decree 45 of 1995 and incorporated in the 1997 Constitution.

33.3.2.	State Intelligence Service shall-

33.3.2.1.	Have the lead role in intelligence on national security matters both internal and external;

33.3.2.2.	Gather, analyze and collate intelligence to protect The Gambia from all external and internal threats;

33.3.2.3.	Closely work and collaborate with the ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and

Finance, Labor Organizations and any other organization as may be deemed necessary;

33.3.2.4. Closely work with other services to provide protection to the President and his properties, First Family, and all other VIPs as may be necessary;

33.3.2.5. Provide the Government and other relevant consumers with accurate and verifiable intelligence relating to external and internal threats;

33.3.2.6. Provide advice for our domestic and foreign policy matters as they relate to national security;

33.3.2.7. Share Intelligence and cooperate with international partners where necessary in the interest of national security;

33.3.2.8. Screen, vet, and clear all private security firms before registration;

33.3.2.9. Screen and vet personnel of all national security institutions before enrollment and as may be deemed necessary, as well as prospective holders of sensitive public service positions;

33.3.2.10. Perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the President or by any other Act of the National Assembly.

33.4. **The Gambia Immigration Department (GID)**

33.4.1. GID, which was established under the Immigration Act 1965, is mandated to execute the following functions:

33.4.1.1. Facilitate, control, monitor and regulate entry, residence and exit of persons at entry points and localities within the country.

33.4.1.2. Control and regulate residency through issuance of residence and work permits as prescribed in the Immigration Act and other international legal instruments relating to migration;

33.4.1.3. Enforce the Citizenship and Nationality Act 1965 and its amendments;

33.4.1.4. Enforce the Registration of Aliens Act 1977 and its Amendments;

33.4.1.5. Issuance of Passport, Identity Card and other Travel Documents;

33.4.1.6. Enforce the Refugee Act 2008;

33.4.1.7. Implement bilateral, multilateral and international conventions such as the ECOWAS framework on free movement of persons and goods;

33.4.1.8. Deployment of officers to visa sections of various Embassies and Consular offices of the Gambia to enhance accurate visa issuance.

33.5. Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG)

33.5.1. Drug Law Enforcement Agency, The Gambia (DLEAG) is the lead agency mandated to regulate and control Drug Abuse, Illegal Drug Trafficking and related activities by enforcing the Drug Control Act 2003 and all international protocols and conventions relative to drugs signed and ratified by The Gambia. The functions of the Agency are to:

33.5.1.1. Enforce all laws, rules, regulations and policies regulating or controlling the abuse and trafficking of illicit drugs.

33.5.1.2. Advice government through the ministry on drug related matters.

33.5.1.3. Control the abuse and misuse of controlled drugs.

33.5.1.4. Sensitize the general public particularly the youth on the dangers of drug abuse.

33.6. The Gambia Fire and Rescue Services (GFRS)

33.6.1. The Gambia Fire Service Act No. 19 of 1948. The mandate of the Fire and Rescue Service is to:

33.6.1.1.   Perform the function of saving life in fire and other disasters,

33.6.1.2.   Protecting life and property from destruction and catastrophe (Manmade or natural),

33.6.1.3.   Render humanitarian services, and;

33.6.1.4.   Assist in the protection of the environment.

33.7.   **The Gambia Prison Services (GPS)**

33.7.1.   The GPS is established under Section 182 of the constitution with the mandate to:

33.7.1.1.   Maintain the safety of inmates under custody which includes their welfare, shelter and food and

33.7.1.2.   To reform and rehabilitate.

33.7.1.3.   To reintegrate inmate back to the society.

33.8.   **The Gambia Revenue Authority (Custom and Excise)**

33.8.1.   The Gambia Revenue Authority is a merger of the former Customs & Excise and Domestic Taxes Departments for the purpose of maximizing revenue collection and also brings about economic

sovereignty and self-reliance as a country. It was established in 2004 by an Act of the National Assembly.

33.8.2. The main mandate of the department are as follows:

33.8.2.1. Collect revenue on all taxable imports;

33.8.2.2. Collection of trade statistics for GBOS and other stakeholders;

33.8.2.3. Preventing illegal exports and imports.

33.8.2.4. Processing of cargo, including documentary checks and physical examination of goods imported into the country.

33.8.2.5. Surveillance of coastal and land borders to prevent smuggling activities.

33.8.2.6. Protection of external borders from illegal aliens, drugs and other criminal activities.

33.8.2.7. To implement and manage free trade agreements with other Customs Administration with a view to facilitate international trade and the free movement of persons across our national border.

33.8.2.8. Protecting intellectual property rights.

33.8.2.9. To collaborate with other security agencies to conduct joint security operations.

SECURITY SECTOR RESPONSE

34.   In pursuance of its aspirations to enhance professional competence, effectiveness and collaboration, this policy directs the establishment and implementation offlagship programs as follows:

34.1.   Support the establishment and operationalization of the Office of National Security.

34.2.   Reorganization, right-sizing and restructuring of defense and security forces into professional, representative and balanced forces;

34.3.   Judicial and correctional reforms to ensure access to justice for all people in the Gambia;

34.4.   Rehabilitation and (re) construction of infrastructure;

34.5.   Building of material and human capacities;

34.6.   Strengthening civilian oversight and the democratic control of the defence forces and security services, including the reform of governance and security institutions;

34.7.   Fight against the proliferation of weapons

34.8.   Fight against impunity, ensure transitional justice

34.9.   Rehabilitation and reconstruction of administrative structures

34.10.   Strengthening of the administration in regions and districts

34.11.   Promotion of national unity and cohesion

34.12.   Promote and institutionalize democratic governance

34.13.   Coordinate institutional reforms

34.14.   Support capacity building of the administrative and local authorities

34.15.   Strengthen diplomacy (bilateral, multilateral and international relations and cooperation)

34.16.   Fight against corruption, favoritism and nepotism

34.17.   Respect, protect and fulfil human rights principles and standards

34.18.   Improve public financial management

34.19.   Advocate for a transparent and accountable management of natural resources

34.20.   Support capacity building of civil society and the media

34.21.   Encourage the promotion of gender equity

34.22.   Create an enabling environment for economic recovery and sustainable growth

34.23.   Advocate for the expansion and strengthening of public services (water, electricity, etc.) and basic social services (health and education) throughout the country

34.24.   Advocate development of basic infrastructure (roads, telephone networks and internet services, Seaport)

34.25.　Promote environmental management and climate change mitigation

34.26.　Mobilize resources

34.27.　Create employment opportunities

JOINT HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

35.　**Joint Human Resource Development Center.** The establishment of a Human Resource Development Center is required to provide a joint holistic capacity. This joint facility shall be under the purview of the National Security Council. The focus of this joint facility shall be:

35.1.　To attract and retain quality personnel.

35.2.　To enhance the professionalism of security personnel.

35.3.　To enhance inter-operability of the security sector.

35.4.　To enhance the judicious use of resources.

36.　**Appointments.** The appointment of the following members is essential for the Gambia Security Sector governance and management forward:

36.1.　The minister of defense.

36.2.　National Security Adviser (NSA), and a Deputy NSA.

37.　**Joint Medical Facility.** This provides for the establishment of a joint medical facility to cater for personnel of all the security institutions.

OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW MECHANISM

38.   An effective oversight body will help to deter corruption, promote independent and unbiased monitoring and investigation and ensure that public officials correctly exercise the power conferred upon them. In other words, a proficient oversight will also help to reduce incidents of human rights violations by members of the security sector and foster better relationship between them and the civilian population.

     38.1.   **Oversight Architecture.**

          38.1.1.   The priority of the oversight framework is to ensure that the security sector bodies do conform to laws, policies, rules and regulations that govern them.

          38.1.2.   A critical requirement for the implementation of this policy is a functional democratic control and enhanced oversight mechanisms that are effective and efficient through a legitimate governance framework or architecture. This will facilitate the creation of a highly professional and law-abiding security sector that is responsive to the security needs of the people and subordinate to civilian authority, by adhering to the principles of human rights and committed to the rule of law.

     38.2.   **The Legislature.** The role of the National Assembly with respect to the security sector resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions. According to the 1997 Constitution, "no person shall raise any police service except by and under the authority of an Act of Parliament." A subsequent article makes a similar statement concerning raising an armed force the key mandate of the standing committee on Security is to provide parliamentary oversight to ensure accountability and transparency in the Security sector.

38.3. **The Judiciary**. The Judiciary controls and oversees the security sector by ensuring that the use of intrusive powers without constitutional and legislative justification are curtailed. The judiciary will also support the prohibition of the limitation of the rights and freedoms of the citizens through the use of unlawful intrusive operational methods.

38.4. **The Executive.** The Gambia's political and institutional systems are based on a separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. The 1997 Constitution adequately stipulates the authority of executive oversight of the security sector. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the constitutional mandate to oversee the security services. In keeping with good governance principles, the executive should ensure that all institutions establish internal checks and balances or internal monitoring mechanisms.

38.5. **Independent Civil bodies.** In keeping with the spirit of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which, among other things, underscores the need for peace, security, stability and human rights based on people's participation, inclusion and ownership of democratic processes, empowers the office of the ombudsman as a designated civil institution to investigate complaints from the public and service members, and to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

39. A review mechanism should be established to examine the NSP on regular basis, at least every 5 years, and upon major changes in the national, regional and international security arena. A committee of major national stakeholders shall conduct these periodic reviews of the NSP. The purpose of the review is to align existing policy with prevailing political, economic and social realities of the country.

CHAPTER 3: POLICY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION

40.   The NSP is the overarching framework of National Security directing, amongst others, what strategic pathways each individual security organ must follow to enable the collective achievement of the national security aspirations of the people of The Gambia. While the realization of these objectives primarily lie with the people of the Gambia, it is nonetheless critical that strategic, tactical and technical partnerships through bilateral/multilateral security protocols/agreements are sought for this journey.

41.   On the other hand, and particularly important will be the need to galvanize partnership and collaboration with the donor community/partners for both the NSP and the subsequent security sector wide reforms necessary to implement the Policy.The already demonstrated fervor, from donor partners and specialized agencies through the deployment of critical resources is well noted and quite encouraging. Such commitment needs to be harness to deliver the resultant values aspired in the policy document, as well as, embedded in the follow-on SSR.

42.   Similarly Inter Services Technical and Social/Welfare partnership and collaboration,should be an integral part of the institutional relationships.Technical cooperation as it relates to joint operations and coordination of separate but overlapping functions are a prerequisite for sector wide effectiveness and efficiency. Mutually reinforcing and therefore very important is the need for the development of inter-services socialization and welfare partnerships and collaborations for the primary purpose of enhancing Esprit de Corps amongst the services.

43.   The Services should build bridges with the NGOs, CBOs/CSOs and the public at large as a conduit to enhance aiding civil defence capacity and resilience.Invariably,such a close relationship will facilitate the development of the necessary environment for the Services and the people to complement each other for greater national security.

44. **The Role of Civil Society Organizations.**

44.1. In the spirit of the objectives and principles of the constitutive Act of the African Union and the Statues of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Government of The Gambia remains committed to ensure the participation of CSOs in the needs assessment, formulation, adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector policy. The civil society organizations (CSOs)can address communal violence and promote human security through development, human rights monitoring and mitigate environmental degradation.

44.2. In this regard, government encourages CSOs to play a positive role in enhancing security sector responsiveness to the security and justice needs of the state and people within the ambit of the law. Furthermore, they are urge to continue to alleviate social tensions and conflict, through the facilitation and promotion of dialogue, tolerance and the culture of peace.

45. **The Gambia - Senegal Relationship.** As mentioned earlier the Gambia, being contiguous to Senegal on all sides except to the west (Atlantic Coast), provides ample opportunity for security cooperation and socio-economic development of both countries.

46. **International Cooperation and Collaboration.** The support of the international community to the security sector reform and the transitional justice process, offer viable opportunities for the country to establish strong national cohesion, unity, peace and security upon which national development could be anchored. This is an invaluable opportunity that should be effectively exploited.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATIONAND COORDINATION

47.   Over the years, National Treasury has been the major source of funds for security activities, therefore all resources allocated must be used prudently. The wellbeing of the country depends on how the country is protected, hence the Gambian people expect effective delivery of defence and protection. Thepercentage of the annual budget allocated to the security sector should therefore be prudently utilized through sustainable spending by security institutions. In the same vein, it should be realistically based on the security needs and requirements of the country.

48.   It must be understood that security capabilities and preparedness are tied to the availability of resources. This should call for a regular review of the financial and material resources management that will enhance effective and efficient service delivery by the security sector. Therefore, mobilization strategies should explore an expanded range of resources from both localand international sources by focusing on the deepening of relations with existing and prospective donor partners.

COMMUNICATION

49.   A comprehensive Communication strategy is vital to incorporate the media outfits, Internet services and satellite/cable television channels, think-tanks, civil society organizations and other platforms as a mechanism for information sharing, advocacy, innovation and feedback on key security issues with national and international dimensions.

50.   This will address the need to inform the people of the concerns and security challenges affecting their well-being, livelihood and their future. This will foster cooperation to ensure safety and help restore public trust in the security sector.

51.   Therefore, this policy directs that the government devotes the required resources to efficiently manage the information and effectively communicate its message to the public at all times. This policy directs that all security institutions comply fully with the above requirements.

WAYFORWARD

52.   The development of this NSP will be followed by the development of National Security Strategy and other polices/strategies, such as Defence Policy, Safety and Security Policy, Judicial Policy, Maritime Security Policyetc.

53.   There should be the establishment of a National Security Policy Monitoring Committee to be chaired by the Secretary General and Head of Civil Service. The committee shall be responsible for the management of the NSP and Subordinate Security Policies.

EXIT STRATEGY: PBF-FUNDED SSR PROJECT IN THE GAMBIA

Background

At the request of the Government of The Gambia, the UN launched a PBF-Funded SSR project to support the security sector reform processes of the new administration of President Barrow following former President Jammeh's 22-year authoritarian regime.

The aim of the project is to provide strategic advice and support to the designing and launching of the national security sector reform process. The project had 2 main outcomes:

- ✓ Provide the Gambian authorities with strategic and technical support to conduct an assessment of the security sector, design and start implementation of a nationally-led inclusive and participatory SSR process;
- ✓ Coordinate the support of the international community to the reform process of the security sector

The project also provides for the development of relevant policy frameworks and support for the establishment and operationalization of the Office of National Security and a formalized mechanism to ensure sustainability in the delivery of national security under democratic control.

Much has been achieved in this support within a timeframe that has extended beyond the planned 18 months (May 2017 – Oct 2018) duration of the project. A no-cost-extension was approved to extend to May 2019 and a further extension is now being approved to extend the project life till Dec 2019.

This strategy describes an overview of considerations for a planned exit by the end of the project in Dec 2019.

A Cardinal Caveat

A key caveat to note at the onset is that SSR processes are not palliative interventions and must be planned to be long term to be able to achieve the level of changes which SSR aims at.

Having made this point, it is also obvious that there would be a time that international partners (including the UN) would disengage. And hence the need for an exit strategy even as this is considered a premature proposition at this stage, given the significant loss The Gambia would face if the UN were to disengage sooner rather than much later.

Purpose and Criteria for exit

The goal of this strategy is to ensure the sustainability of the positive transformation that have been achieved in order to institutionalize best practices adopted beyond the life of the project.

Whilst the new deadline is envisaged as Dec 2019, it is critical that the exit strategy should revolve around the achievement of the following key benchmarks to ensure sustainability of the impacts after the UN shall have left:

1. Support the full establishment and operationalization of the ONS consistent with the evolving constitution;
2. Support a regularized National Security Council (NSC) and the decision-making architecture;
3. Support the regularized meetings of the Heads of the Defence and Security Institutions as part of the decision-making process;
4. Support the development of a Communication Strategy to support SSR and wider reform processes; and
5. Support the development and implementation of a mobilization strategy.

Concerted Efforts Needed for Success

The SSR Team would endeavour to achieve these goals in the next 6 months going strictly by the exit criteria of time limit. It cannot be over-emphasized however that it is most helpful to The Gambia if the exit criteria is determined by the successful implementation of the above benchmarks. To achieve this, the team would benefit greatly from the support of the UN family to encourage GoTG to implement what it has committed itself to achieve in the immediate short term. Such commitment has been articulated in recent meetings of the rekindled political will to establish the ONS and to address the requirement for success. This political will can best be crystalized in the proposed High-Level retreat where the UN and International partners can agree with the government on an MOU to set timelines to achieve the above benchmarks. The strategy therefore requires the collaborative efforts of the Government, The UN Family and the SSR Teams supporting the process.

Disengagement of the SSR Team

Once these benchmarks have been implemented, the UN may disengage its SSR Team using a phasing over[1] approach. This would mean continuing some level of support to ensure that the ONS continues to coordinate and support the holding of the regular coordinating meetings of 1) the NSC; 2) the Heads of the Security Institutions; and 3) any remaining International SSR partners forums.
Consideration should be made for a residual liaison arrangement with a relevant UN entity already established in The Gambia, e.g UNODC, IOM etc to maintain some link with continuing work on the reform processes.

Assessed Risk If Key Benchmarks not met

Failing to achieve the criteria benchmarks before the exit of the UN support will be debilitating with the potential of reversing all gains made. Most central to such a collapse will be due to the absence of fully capacitated body such as the ONS empowered to sustain the process. The current commitment of the UN is clearly unmatched in its drive to ensure that the ONS is fully established and operationalized to support the work of the NSC and overall decision-making architecture going forward.

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[1] 3 key approaches of disengaging from a program include: phasing down (gradual reduction of support); phasing out (withdrawal of involvement); and phasing over (transfer of program activities to local institutions)

In this regard, this risk is better managed and reduced to minimal levels if regular consultations are carried out with other international actors to ensure sustainability of impacts of project goals that have been achieved thus far. All stakeholders should be encouraged to maintain the momentum in enhancing the capacity of the decision-making architecture anchoring on empowering the ONS

Monitoring and Evaluation

A monitoring and evaluation team need to be established to timely monitor the implementation of the agreed benchmarks to ensure the success of the exit strategy.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The exit strategy is important to plan for sustainability of the impact of the SSR Project after the UN shall have withdrawn its support in the SSR processes. The conditions for the phasing over (instead of phasing out) the UN support should be better determined by the achievement of key benchmarks rather than strictly the time-limit now being considered.

The importance of ensuring the implementation of the key benchmarks cannot be overemphasized. The UN's investment in the SSR efforts already is significant and it would be exorbitant if a premature withdrawal of support in this critical area causes a reversal in the reforms of the security sector.

It is therefore recommended that whilst this exist strategy is well in place to be considered, endorsed and published, the UN should prioritize rekindling its commitment and re-engage more decisively to support a comprehensive and holistic SSR process in The Gambia.

GENDER RESPONSIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM TRAINING WORKSHOP

Intermediate Training

Banjul, The Gambia

15-26 April 2019

- REPORT OF THE TRAINING WORKSHOP -

For
The United Nations Development Programme
UNDP - Banjul
Written and submitted by
Sheikh Omar Fye
Consultant
Conflict- Gender-Peace and Security Expert

May 2019

1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE TRAINING

This recently successfully concluded Security Sector Reform (SSR) Gender Responsive Intermediate Training, was sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in The Gambia, in collaboration with the Government of the Gambia (GoG) It was a sequel to the Basic SSR Training held 15-26 , which itself is part of a 3-level curriculum designed to bring about a much more productive SSR. Essentially, that training brought together a broad spectrum of security actors in the country together with the Women's Bureau and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to not only share experiences but also to diagnose the paucity of gender parity in the forces by identifying issues and challenges responsible for the untenable status quo and brainstorm on appropriate strategies to improving gender mainstreaming while not sacrificing the sector's performance and service delivery. In many respects, therefore, the training while premised on gender issues, equally served as a forum for greater sectoral dialogue capable of advancing esprit de corps.

The topics covered in the last training were:

- Understanding Security Sector Reform & Understanding Gender
- Gender analysis
- Key findings of the SSR report of The Gambia
- Challenges and opportunities in mainstreaming Gender in the security sector
- Legal frameworks and international commitments on women, gender, peace and security
- UN and AU SSR legal frameworks
- Building a civilian-friendly security sector
- Building/strengthening capacities in the security sector: needs and entry points
- Gender policy: what it is and how does it contribute to a gender responsive SSR?
- The national security policy (what it is? An introduction to the ongoing process)
- Collaboration between security sector institutions: how do we work together and integrate gender issues in our work?

The 15-26 April training which was held at the Ocean Bay, Cape Point was a logical extension of the themes raised by the earlier training and a reinforcement of the SSR agenda.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in The Gambia, in collaboration with the Government of the Gambia (GoG) organized a training workshop on the need for a gender responsive security sector reform (SSR). The training programme, the second of a 3-level curriculum (basic, intermediate and advanced) took place from 15-26 2019 at the Ocean Bay, cape Point, The Gambia.

3.0 WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of the training programme was to introduce participants to the need and the importance of mainstreaming gender into the security sector institutions in The Gambia as part of the ongoing nationwide efforts to restructure the security sector in the Gambia following the recommendations of The Gambia SSR assessment report. Specific objectives were to:

4.0. WORKSHOP CONTENT

In order to achieve the foregoing objectives, the following topics were covered:

1. Overview of SSR and Gender
2. Mainstreaming gender into SSR
3. Community Policing and Gender
4. Conflict Management
5. Gender, State and SSR
6. National Security Policy Making Gender
7. Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolution in SSR
8. Transitional Justice and SSR
9. Gender Based Violence in Conflict Zones
10. Group Defense Reform and Gender
11. Rule of Law and SSR
12. Gender and Strategic Management
13. SSR Gender and Parliamentary Oversight
14. Penal on Reform and Gender
15. Gender SSR and International Organizations
16. SSR Gender and Women in the Security
17. Gender and Leadership
18. Communication and Interpersonal Skills
19. Overview on Gender and National Policies
20. Gender and Border Management Trends
21. National Gender and Women's Empower Policy 2010-2020

5.0. DELIVERY METHODOLOGY

Being a knowledge, skill and attitudinal workshop, participative training methods and techniques such as lecturettes, exercises, case studies, role paly and discussion were used. Technology was also fully integrated into the delivery by way of PowerPoint projections.

6.0. PARTICIPATION

The training programme was attended by 42 participants drawing from The Gambia Armed Forces, Gambia Police Force, Gambia Prisons services, Gambia Immigration Department, State Intelligence Service, Gambia Fire and Rescue Service and the Drug and Law Enforcement Agency, The Gambia and the Women's Bureau as well civil society organizations. (See Appendix for the list of participants)

7.0. WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

7.1. Opening Ceremony

The opening ceremony started with the introduction of members of the high table. This was followed by the opening prayer observed silently by participants. Rtd. Colonel Momodou Badjie, the National Security Adviser (NSA) gave the welcoming remarks while General Kellie Conteh gave the Overview of the Training Programme and Sheikh Omar Fye, the Consultant briefed the Participants on the Course Content.

In his remarks, the NSA enjoined the participants to make the best use of the opportunity provided by the Workshop to both enhance their capacity and deepen their understanding of gender especially as it relates to security. Rtd. Colonel Badjie emphasized the importance of the Workshop and thanked UNDP SSR team and the Government of the Gambia for funding the workshop along other programs under the collaboration with GoG. This address was followed by supporting remarks from General Conteh. At that juncture, the opening ceremony came to an end.

7.2 TRAINING SESSION

7.2.1 Climate Setting

This session was anchored by UNDP SSR team. In this session the workshop commenced with Climate Setting where Rtd. Colonel Badjie, the National Security Adviser once again welcomed the participants to the training on behalf of the GoG and generally outlined the expectations of the stakeholders. General Conteh, the UNDP SSR Security Adviser similarly praised the sponsoring Organizations for the workshop and assured the participants of effective service delivery.

During this session, coordinating Staff and participants were introduced while exercises on participants' expectations, fears/concerns and action plans were equally given.

8.0. END OF WORKSHOP EVALUATION

At the end of the workshop, the participants were given evaluation forms to fill, below were their responses as detailed in table 1.

8.1 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION

Table 1: **End of Training Evaluation by Participants**

No	Programme Elements	Excellent	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor
(i)	Achievement of set Objectives	33.3%(1)	66.6% (2)	-	-	-
(ii)	Co-ordination/ Organization	33.3%(1)	66.6%(2)	-	-	-
(iii)	Length/ Period	-	100%(3)	-	-	-
(iv)C	Subject Contents	-	100%(3)	-	-	-
(v)	Calibre of Facilitators	66.6%(2)	33.3%(1)	-	-	-
(vi)	Balance between theory and practice	-	100%(3)	-	-	-
(vii)	Overall quality of papers presented	66.6%(2)	33.3%(1)	-	-	-
(viii)	Adequacy of handouts/ Materials	66.6%(2)	33.3%(1)	-	-	-
(ix)	Overall assessment	66.6%(2)	33.3%(1)	-	-	-
(x)	Overall Usefulness	33.3%(1)	66.6%(2)	-	-	-
(xi)	Opportunity for Participation/ Discussion	33.3%(1)	66.6%(2)	-	-	-
(xii)	Facilities- Lecture Room	66.6%(2)	33.3%(1)	-	-	-
(xiii)	To What Extent Did the Program provoke Discussion	75				

Analysis of the Workshop evaluation conducted shows that the Workshop was not only useful but also relevant and rewarding.

8.2 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION

At the end of the workshop, the participants made the following suggestions:

   a. The UNDP/GOG should keep up the good work

   b. Venue should be improved upon.

9.0 END OF SESSIONAL EVALUATION

At the end of each session, the participants were given sessional evaluation forms to fill and their responses on Attendance and Punctuality, Quality of Lecture Materials, Presentation and Clarity of the Subject Matter taken are detailed below:

9.1 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION

Attendance and Punctuality;   84%

Quality of Lecture Materials;   85%

Presentation of Lectures;   80%

Understanding of Subject Matter;   83%

Others (Specify);

9.2 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION

The above result as rated by the participants shows that the Objectives of the Workshop and their expectations were fully met. In summary, the participants rated all the aspects of the workshop as very good which informs that the workshop was worth the efforts.

10. CLOSING CEREMONY

The workshop was formally closed by Rtd. Colonel Badjie on Thursday 26th May, 2019 and the participants were presented with certificates of attendance. The closing ceremony was graced by the special adviser to the President honourable Ahmad Mai Fatty, Mrs. Fatou Kinteh Minister for Women Social Welfare and Children's Affairs, Mr. Husein Thomasi, Adviser to Ministry of Justice, ECOWAS UN Representative. UN Resident Representatiive were also among the dignitaries and all of them thank the stakeholders especially the GoG , UNDP, the Consultant among others. The Service Chiefs were in attendance. The next step is the Gender SSR Advanced Training to be implemented in June.

SSR Partners (with IAGs) Meeting with H.E. The President of the Republic of The Gambia, H.E. Adama Barrow

Friday, 19th February, 2019

11am to 12 pm   : State House, Cabinet Room

- Nessie Golakai-Gould, UNDP RR a.i.
- Mr Kellie Conteh, Senior SSR Adviser
- Mr. Baboucarr Sowe, SSR Specialist

:

- HE President of the Republic of the Gambia
- Secretary General (SG), Office of the President
- Police Adviser to the IGP
- EU Ambassador
- ECOWAS representative
- All SSR IAGs (EU, AU, ECOWAS, USA, France)

There was no formal agenda. The SG informed that the President requested the SSR partners meeting to reiterate his government's commitment to SSR and to renew calls for a continuous international support.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in the Gambia has been steadily progressing but with a very slow pace. This was attributed to a number of problems largely predicated on political challenges of a transitioning administration. Notably, key offices at the executive level have changed leadership 'hands' including a visible lack of coordination and a common vision resulting in the erosion of the little consensus built around the understanding of the concept of SSR. The President has not (until this meeting) directly received or summoned any of the SSR team of international experts in order to seek for advice or provide direction and guidance on how SSR needed to be undertaken and supported in the Gambia. The burden was directly shifted to the National Security Adviser, whose nascent office remained understaffed and has not attain Full Operational Capacity. As a result, including a combinational of other factors, the SSR's project activities also stalled resulting in the carrying forward of many of its scheduled plans for 2018. This growing concerns have crossed national boundaries and have politically reached a tipping point and as a result, the President of the Republic of the Gambia, H.E. Adama Barrow, saw the need to convene a special "in-house family" meeting (as he called it) of the key SSR

partners on 15 February 2019 to re-affirm his full support and that of his government's leadership and ownership of the SSR process. The UN, ECOWAS and EU with their SSR technical experts were in attendance.

Following an introductory remark, the SG began by stating that the meeting is a special one called for by the President to speak directly to the partners (and SSR advisers/experts) on SSR matters. There was no media coverage and it was an in-house one:

- On his part, the President gave and renewed his assurances for undertaking SSR process. He referenced the commitments he made in Brussels during the last pledging conference on Gambia that he remained committed to a reformed security sector that is accountable to a civilian authority and delivers efficient and effective services.
- The President, who stated that SSR is his top agenda, reiterated the need for the 'right sizing' (which may mean upward or downward sizing) of the security to make it affordable and manageable in accordance with recommendations made in the Public Expenditure Review.
- Raised concern that the tribe belong to the former President constitutes only 7% of the population while occupying 60% of the strength of the army. The President underscored the need to correct this tribal imbalance.
- HE Called on the international advisers to remain ceased of the SSR support and advise being provided while he rejuvenate the political will for SSR leadership and ownership. The SG will serve as the entry point and focal person (Open Line) to draw his attention on all SSR matters he needed to know or take care of..
- Informed that the "profiling process" within the army is ongoing. The first auditing process of the army has seen the departure of some 900 army elements. Emphasised the need for capacity building of the security sector and the review of the ranking system. HE sighted the so many "Generals" in the army as an example
- Confirmed and stressed that the ECOMIG forces will serve as cover to support tough decisions of the SSR process. Urged international advisers of his political support and guidance.
- Announced that 100% political support is assured and would henceforth set time lines for the SSR implementation process
- : Reiterated the need for right-sizing and making those tough decisions,
- Announced apologies for unavailability of RC, Hailed the personal intervention of the President, shared justification for the extension of the PBF SSR project given renewed commitments of the government to stay the course, lead and own the SSR process. Also referred to "case studies" of other situations to help customize the Gambia case.
- Hailed the government's desire to provide timelines to monitor SSR processes and also expressed satisfaction for the renewed political will.

- Follow up on the launching of NSP. Through NSA, work with the office of SG
- To work with the Office of the SG to follow up on the impending High Level Retreat.

- This is a welcomed meeting and one of the most important one given that its for the first time that the Head of State is directly meeting the SSR partners and their technical experts to discuss SSR

- This meeting should be used as the basis to intensify project implementation activities and request for commitment of SSR partners in government.

- International SSR partners should stay the course in urging and encouraging the government to remain ceased of its renewed commitment to implement SSR.

Meeting Name: IAG Regular Meeting		
Date: Fri, 5 March 2019	**Time:** 09:30:00 to 10:45	**Place:** NSA Conf. Hall, State House
Meeting called by	NSA	
Type of meeting	IAG Meeting	
Moderator/Chair	Supt Seedy Njie and CSP Tamba on behalf of Momodou Badjie (NSA) (Gambia),	
Note taker	Baboucarr Sowe, SSR Specialist (UNDP)	
Timekeeper	N/A	
Attendees	Senior Defense and Security Adviser to the Gambia (ECOWAS), SSR Specialist (UNDP) SSR Expert (DCAF), Senior SSR Defense Adviser (AU), SSR Adviser (USA), Senior Adviser –Policy Development (AU), SSR Technical Adviser (France) 2 ONS Staff, Key SSR Expert (EU DAI), ,	
Absent/Excuses/Others	Momodou Badjie (GoTG, NSA) (Gambia), Senior SSR Adviser (UNDP),	

Agenda Topics and Discussions

There was only one agenda item (and AOB) discussed:

1. Discussions to harmonize the SSRS and NSS strategy outline – Looking at way forward and methodology.
2. AOB

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Minutes:

There was no review of minutes of the previous meeting.

Matrix of Discussions:

Agenda Item # (a)	Topic (b)	Discussion Points, Issued Raised and Consensus made (c)	Actions Required and by Whom (d)	Timelines Anticipated (e)
1	Discussions to harmonize the SSRS and NSS strategy outline – Looking at way forward and methodology.	First, the IAG agreed that the meeting should proceed without NSA and other bsentees. ONS staff (Supt Seedy) was assigned to Chair on behalf of NSA and IAG colleagues helped to moderate. The Ag Chair (Seedy) was requested to update "Letter of Invitation" for strategy drafters and have the Special Adviser sign off on it and ONS to ensure distribution. The would-be drafters are expected to report on 17th April at the MOD conf hall	Supt Seedy Njie and all ONS Staff	Immediate and no later than Monday 08 April 2019 for invitation to be sent out. Follow-up to ensure initial contact and provide further guidance towards meeting of 17th April
		Given that the IAG meeting was held earlier than scheduled (met at 09:30am instead of 11am), the SSRS IAG group and ONS staff could not present the final version of the outline content. The group is to meet immediately after the IAG meeting,	ONS staff (CSP Tamba, Hawa) to collate and Coordinate with Todd for	Immediate and a draft be shared on Monday 08 April 2019

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		finalize their submission and share with all IAG for comments	support	
		ONS staff to share combined draft Concept Notes and TOR to all IAG for comments in preps for meeting of IAG on Tuesday 09ᵗʰ April	ONS	Drafts to be discussed in the IAG meeting on Tue 9ᵗʰ April 2019
		ONS to draft (and finalize) a letter to the SSR partners requesting them to sponsor and support funding for the upcoming NSS and SSRS concurrent drafting to last for 90 calendar days (3 months) for the completion of a zero draft. This should include a joint retreat. Workshop and other relevant activities	ONS staff	Immediate
		UNDP was requested to share (by email to ONS and IAGs) a draft "costing paper" to draw reference from and help facilitate discussions on costs and areas of support by IAG,	UNDP	Immediate
		ONS staff have been requested to follow-up and update on suitable venue for the team of drafters to begin work (exact date TBD) soon after their briefing on 17 April.	ONS (Supt Seedy and ASI Sallah)	Ongoing progress

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		EU Key SSR Expert suggested to have an inclusive participation in the drafting team, to comprise oversight and governance bodies and a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Def and Sec.	ONS to consider suggestion	Immediate
2	AOB	IAG and ONS staff bid farewell to Ms Sossi on her prompt departure from the Gambia following the announcement of her resignation from the DAI project. IAG and ONS staff (by turns) spoke about the short stint of Ms Sossi with ONS and thanked her for her valuable contribution and support to the SSR process Next IAG meeting will be held on Tue, 09 April 2019 at the NSA Conf. hall at 11am promt.	All IAGs and ONS	N/A

Other miscellaneous issues: NSTR

The IAG meeting went on for approximately 1hr and 15 mins. The next meeting has been scheduled as shown in the AOB above.

IAG Secretariate

Minutes Recorded by:
Baboucarr Sowe, SSR Team
c/o Office of National Security

Meeting Name: IAG Regular Meeting		
Date: Monday, 10 Dec 2018	**Time:** 11:00 to 13:45	**Place:** NSA Conf. Hall, State House
Meeting called by	NSA	
Type of meeting	IAG Meeting	
Moderator/Chair	Momodou Badjie (NSA)	
Note taker	Baboucarr Sowe (UNDP)	
Timekeeper	N/A	
Attendees	National Security Adviser (NSA) (Gambia), SSR Adviser (USA), SSR Expert (EU), Senior Adviser –Policy Development (AU), Senior SSR Defense Adviser (AU), SSR Specialist (UNDP), Senior SSR Adviser (UNDP) SSR Expert (DCAF), Senior Defense and Security Adviser to the Gambia (ECOWAS)	
Absent/Excuse	Nil	
Agenda Topics and Discussions		

The Agenda items discussed during the meeting are as follows:
Items:

1. Update on CRC
2. "Tour de table" (Individual IAG Briefings)
3. Matrix: Joint Plans
4. AOB

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Discussions:

The minutes of the previous meeting were reviewed page-by-page to ascertain 'action points' and decisions arrived at. Observations were made and the updates provided from matters arising are summarized below:

On NSP: It appears the launching for 17th Dec may automatically delay due to inconclusive SC meeting which has now been rescheduled for 18 Dec. Key Ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs) were visibly absent due to other informed official errands. It was not clear whether the National Security Council would even take place. These developments were perceived as yet another delay and possibly little chance to have the NSP approved and launched before the end of the year.

On Coordination: IAG members discussed and agree on sharing information amongst themselves regarding intended (projected) activities and more importantly, on maximizing support efforts - using comparative advantages and avoiding duplications while working closely with the NSA. IAGs will fill in the matrix template and Kellie will collate.

IAG requested for an update on the Cabinet Paper and NSA stated that the status-quo remains – No final version published at this time. IAGs urged for keen follow-up since this is an importance guidance document for the SSR process.

Minutes Recorded by:
Baboucarr Sowe, SSR Team
c/o Office of National Security

Meeting Details:

Agenda Item # (a)	Topic (b)	Discussion Points, Issued Raised and Consensus made (c)	Actions Required and by Whom (d)	Timelines Anticipated (e)
1	Update on CRC	The NSA announced that the deadline has been extended to 30 December. for SSR inputs using a 2-prong approach: Sent to CRC directly or through the NSA. The EU expert has submitted an input through NSA.	NSA	30 Dec: Deadline for inputs
		NSA was also advised by the IAGs to request for a meeting with the CRC and IAG members to discuss relevant SSR issues for the new constitutions	NSA	TBD
2	"Tour De Table" Individual IAG updates	AU: Working closely with GAF and supporting the cleaning of beaches to serve as image building and CIMIC implementation.	AU	ongoing

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		AU plans to hold a consultative dialogue (workshop) on enhancing the integration of RoL, SSR, TJ and governance into stabilization efforts – drawing from lessons for silencing the guns by 2020 2 AU female experts arrived (1 for HR and the other for RoL)	AU. (all IAGs invited)	12 to 14 Dec at Metzy Residence Hotel
		UNDP: Apologized for cancellation of the twice-scheduled Intermediate Gender Training due to some unforeseen technical reason. New dates (hopefully in early next year 2019) will be announced. UNDP had written its Annual Work Plan and would share with IAG colleagues with a view to apprise everyone on scheduled/planned activities.	Kellie/BS	12 Dec to share copies
		UNDP also announced an initiative of bringing together Security (GPF, DLEAG), Justice (Solicitor General) and Corrections (GPS) to consider development a strategic framework (for support) to help narrow the gaps and tackle the challenges identified in the last SSR assessment. Preliminary one-on-one meetings were held with heads of these institutions. The ultimate aim is to help build synergy for an effective and efficient security and justice delivery and to guide SSR partners to calibrate their 2019 projected activities, enhance coordination and effectively use comparative advantages given the many actors with similar intended support. A planned brainstorming meeting of the stakeholders has been scheduled.	NSA to send invitation letters immediately	Stakeholder meeting on 13th Dec at NSA conf

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				room
		ECOWAS: Announced that an advert for the post of Communications Strategist will be published soon.	No further action required	
		New CONOPS for ECOMIG forces has been drafted to incorporate the 500 Senegalese forces following the ECOWAS clearance. This brings their total number to 1,056.		
		There will be an ECOWAS summit in Abuja on 22 Dec.		
		USA: Weekly SSR Focal Persons meeting has been agreed with NSA approval to meet every Wednesday with OS staff to update on their roles and share information.	Todd	Weekly on Wednesdays
		EU: Mentioned the necessity of developing model of an Integrated Border Management for The Gambia and possible EU contribution to it, in consultations with the DG of Immigration, IOM and DCAF. She also mentioned that deployment of an expert to develop a vetting policy and mechanism is planned in the 1st quarter of 2019. EU will also help to Revise the Police Act in the 1st quarter of 2019 and is discussing with UNDP and other actors, how to jointly support the Criminal Justice Chain.		
		DCAF Continues to support the NAM Committee on Defense and Security and has 4 thematic areas		

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3	AOB	EU announced the launching ceremony of the State Building Contract Project, including its SSR component at Kairaba Beach Hotel of the EU State Building Project	Sossi	Tues11 Dec

Other miscellaneous issues: NSTR

The IAG meeting went on for approximately 2hours, 45 Minutes. The next meeting is scheduled to hold on Monday, 17th Dec. 2018

Minutes Recorded by:
Baboucarr Sowe, SSR Team
c/o Office of National Security